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CIVIL PROCEDURE: A REVIEW OF THE PUBLISHED
OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT





During its 1983-84 term, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit decided a number of cases dealing with issues of federal
civil procedures. This article reviews most of those cases. The cases
have been classified under the following headings: Federal Jurisdiction,
Voluntary Dismissal, Involuntary Dismissal, Summary Judgment, De-
fault Judgment, Class Actions, Intervention, Res Judicata, Relief from
Judgment, Appellate Review, Discovery, Costs, Fees and Sanctions.
I. FEDERAL JURISDICTION
Personal Jurisdiction
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Norton v. Bridges,' con-
cluded that the Wisconsin long-arm statute authorized the trial court to
assert jurisdiction over a trustee who resided in Illinois, as well as the
trust assets that were also present in Illinois.2 In Norton, the beneficiary
of an inter vivos trust sued the trustee for a reduction of trust assets to her
possession, and an accounting and termination of the trust. The district
court held that it lacked both in rem jurisdiction over the trust assets,
and personal jurisdiction over the trustees.
3
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1. 712 F.2d 1156 (7th Cir. 1984).
2. The facts of Norton are somewhat complicated. The trust was recorded in Wisconsin, but
the trustee invested the assets in his home mortgage in Illinois. The original trustee died and willed
the house and trusteeship to his wife. Subsequently, the new trustee was adjudicated a disabled
person, and a guardian was named for the trustee and her estate. The trustee's house was later sold
for $48,501. Notice of the sale was allegedly given to the beneficiary.
3. Id. at 1158.
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In determining which forum should exercise in rem jurisdiction, the
Seventh Circuit focused on the question of which forum had the author-
ity to administer the trust. In this regard, the court distinguished the
facts in Hanson v. Denkla4 from the present case.5 Unlike Hanson, the
trust in this case was created and registered in the forum state. In addi-
tion, the power of appointment of successor trustees was expressly cre-
ated in the forum court. Based on these facts, the court concluded that
the settlor intended administration of the trust in Wisconsin, 6 and that
when the trustees accepted the trusteeship, they consented to jurisdiction
in the forum state. The court held that these facts satisfied the "mini-
mum contacts" standard of International Shoe.7 Therefore, the Seventh
Circuit reversed the district court, and concluded that an exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction by the Wisconsin court was consistent with due
process.
In addition, the Seventh Circuit concluded that an assertion of juris-
diction was authorized under the Wisconsin long-arm statute.8 In order
to reach this conclusion, the court examined the relevant sections of the
statute. Based on this statutory analysis, the court found two alternative
rationales for its conclusion: 1) an exercise of in rem jurisdiction over a
trust permits a determination of the rights and liabilities of all interested
parties;9 and 2) under Wisconsin Statute § 801.05(6), since the trustee
4. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
5. The court explained the facts of Hanson:
In Hanson, an inter vivos trust was created by a Pennsylvania settlor. The settlor named a
Delaware trust company as trustee. The trust res was placed with the trustee in Delaware.
The settlor then moved to Florida and died shortly thereafter. The settlor's will was ad-
mitted to probate in Florida. An issue arose as to whether the settlor had exercised a
testamentary power of appointment over the corpus of the trust. The Florida Supreme
Court held that Florida could exercise jurisdiction over the non-resident trustee and the
non-resident beneficiaries of the trust even though the trust assets were in Delaware.
712 F.2d at 1159 (emphasis added).
Subsequently, Delaware refused to accord the judgment full faith and credit. The Supreme
Court reviewed the case and held that Florida did not have sufficient minimum contacts over the
trust because the trust office was not located in Florida, and had transacted no business there. More-
over, none of the assets had ever been administered in Florida, and no solicitation of business had
ever taken place in Florida. 357 U.S. at 257.
6. 712 F.2d at 1161-62. The court stated that the most important factor evidencing intent for
administration in Wisconsin was the fact that the trust was registered in the state.
7. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1943).
8. 712 F.2d at 1164.
9. The Wisconsin long-arm statute provides in relevant part that: A court of this state having
jurisdiction of the subject matter may exercise jurisdiction in rem or quasi in rem on the grounds
stated in this section.
(1) When the subject of the action is real or personal property in this state and the defendant has or
claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, therein, or the relief granted demanded consists
wholly or partially in excluding the defendant from any interest or lien therein.
WIs. STAT. § 801.07.
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assumed control of the assets in Wisconsin at the time the trust was cre-
ated, personal jurisdiction may be asserted.' 0
Nelson v. Park Industries, Inc.,"I presented the issue of whether a
court in Wisconsin could exercise long-arm jurisdiction over two foreign
corporations. Both corporations had placed goods into the "stream of
commerce," but neither corporation controlled the distribution network.
The district court dismissed plaintiff's complaint against the two foreign
corporations, holding that it lacked personal jurisdiction because the de-
fendant's contacts with the forum state were not such to make litigation
reasonably foreseeable. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the
Wisconsin long-arm statute' 2 authorized jurisdiction over a "distribu-
tor's purchase and sale of goods in the normal course of the distribution
of those goods."'
' 3
In addition, the court held that this exercise of the long-arm statute
was constitutional under the World-wide Volkswagen v. Woodson 14 "min-
imum contacts" standard. The court's analysis focused on the extensive
distribution network which carried the goods into the forum state and
caused the injury. Though the two corporations did not control the dis-
tribution network, they were aware of the network and therefore, were
indirectly serving and deriving economic benefits from the national retail
market established by Woolworth, and they should reasonably anticipate
being subject to suit in any forum within that market where the product
caused injury.' 5 As compared with a local distributor whose products
have fortuitously entered the forum state, being subject to litigation in
Wisconsin was much more foreseeable for these two defendants because
they were original distributors into "the national retail market."
10. This section provides in relevant part that Wisconsin permits an assertion of personal juris-
diction in any action which arises out of:
c. A claim that the defendant return, restore, or account to the plaintiff for any asset or
thing of value which was within this state at the time the defendant acquired possession
or control over it.
WIS. STAT. § 801.05(6)(c).
II. 717 F.2d 1120 (7th Cir. 1983).
12. The statute provides in relevant part:
[iun any action claiming injury to person or property within this state arising out of an act
or omission outside this state by the defendant, providing in addition that at the time of the
injury . . .[p]roducts, materials or things processed, serviced or manufactured by the de-
fendant were used or consumed within this state in the ordinary course of trade.
WIS. STAT. § 801.05(4)(b) (1981-82).
13. 717 F.2d at 1124.
14. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). The Supreme Court in World-Wide Volkswagen stated that: "the
foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere likelihood that a product will find
its way into the forum State. Rather, it is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the
forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being called into court there." Id. at 297
(emphasis added).
15. 717 F.2d at 1126.
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Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The court faced issues of subject matter jurisdiction within the con-
text of several substantive statutes, as well as the diversity and federal
question jurisdiction statutes. For the sake of clarity, each jurisdictional
provision will be discussed separately.
A. Labor Management Relations Act
The Seventh Circuit decided two cases in which the subject matter
jurisdiction of the federal court was at issue under the terms of § 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA).16 In NDK Corporation
v. Local 1550 UFCIWU,1 7 the issue was whether § 301 authorized juris-
diction when the underlying dispute concerned the validity of a labor
contract. Deferring to the primary jurisdiction of the NLRB over such
matters, the court refused to extend the "plain language of § 301."18 It
held that this section "provides jurisdiction for suits for violation of con-
tracts but not for determinations of the validity of contracts where valid-
ity is the ultimate issue." 19
Chicago Area Vending Association v. C.CS. & Teamsters Local No.
761,20 raised the issue of whether § 301 vests the district court with juris-
diction when the violation of a covenant in a labor contract involves both
an association of employers and an employer. The individual employer
had not signed the collective bargaining agreement which allegedly had
been violated. Rather, the agreement was signed by an employer's asso-
ciation for each of the individual employers. Since only the association
was a signing party to the agreement, the employer argued that the dis-
16. This section provides in relevant part that:
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization repre-
senting employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or
between any such labor organization, may be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in
controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976).
17. 709 F.2d 491 (7th Cir. 1983).
18. Id. at 493. The court supported this narrow interpretation of the statute by citing Her-
nandez v. National Packing Co., 455 F.2d 1252 (lst Cir. 1972), which articulated the policy basis for
such an interpretation:
While, to the extent that it could do so without infringing the NLRB's primary jurisdiction,
a district court might be obliged to consider the validity of a collective bargaining agree-
ment when asked to enforce one of its provisions at the behest of the employees. ...
455 F.2d at 1253 (emphasis added). Thus, a court will only consider the validity of a collective
bargaining agreement when necessary to enforce the contract.
The court distinguished this case from Mogge v. District No. 8, 387 F.2d 880, 882 (7th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 936 (1968), primarily on the ground that the validity of the labor
contract was a threshold question not the ultimate issue as in NDK.
19. 709 F.2d at 493.
20. 100 CCH LC 10, 953 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
272
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trict court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over this dispute.
However, the Seventh Circuit rejected this argument because the em-
ployer was named as a party in the agreement, and the dispute arose
directly from a covenant in the agreement. The court found that even
though the employer was not a signing party to the collective bargaining
agreement, it actively participated in the bargaining process, and accord-
ingly could not be considered a third person non-party.
21
B. Commodity Exchange Act
In Tamari v. Bache & Co. ,22 the court was presented with a difficult
issue of first impression: whether the district court had subject matter
jurisdiction under the Commodity Exchange Act 23 (CEA) over a dispute
between nonresident aliens, when the trading of commodity futures con-
tracts giving rise to the suit took place on United States exchanges, but
the contracts between the parties occurred in Lebanon. The court found
that the terms of the CEA were not dispositive of the issues because for-
eign agents were neither excluded nor included within its broad proscrip-
tion against fraudulent commodity futures transactions.
As an alternative means of analysis, the court adopted two judicial
tests: the conduct test, and the effects test. Both of these tests were origi-
nally articulated by the Second Circuit,24 and have been employed by
that court to determine whether the CEA vests district courts with sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. In applying the "conduct test," the crucial con-
cern of the court is whether the foreign agent has used the United States
as a base of operations for the successful completion of the alleged
scheme to defraud. If so, the court will assert jurisdiction "based on the
theory that Congress would not have intended the United States to be
used as a base for effectuating the fraudulent conduct of foreign compa-
nies."'25 Under the "effects test," the court looks to whether the particu-
lar conduct occurring in foreign countries has caused foreseeable and
substantial harm to interests in the United States. Jurisdiction is asserted
on the underlying theory that Congress would have wished domestic
21. The court distinguished two earlier decisions, Baker v. Fleet Maintenance, 409 F.2d 551,
554 (7th Cir. 1969) and Loss v. Blankenship, 673 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1982), on the basis that the non-
signing party to the collective bargaining agreement in these cases was not an active participant in
the collective bargaining process, and therefore was a third person non-party to the contract. 100
CCH LC 10, 953.
22. 730 F.2d 1103 (7th Cir. 1984).
23. 7 U.S.C. §§ 6(b), (c) (1974).
24. Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 722 F.2d 1041, 1046 (2d Cir. 1983).
25. 730 F.2d at 1108. Psimenos was strikingly similar to Tamari and arose at the same time.
The court, in Psimenos, stated as a matter of dicta that "mere preparatory activities" would not
support jurisdiction under the conduct test. 722 F.2d at 1046.
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markets and investors to be protected from improper foreign
transactions.
26
In Tamari, the district court found that the foreign commodity bro-
ker's transmission of allegedly false orders to the United States satisfied
the conduct test. In addition, it found that these activities affected do-
mestic confidence in the market, and influenced the pricing and hedging
functions of the market, thereby satisfying the effects test. The Seventh
Circuit affirmed these findings, and accordingly held that the district
court had subject matter jurisdiction under the CEA.
C. False Claims Act
A qui tam 27 action was brought under the federal False Claims
Act,28 in United States ex. rel. Wisconsin v. Dean,29 in which the State of
Wisconsin sought to recover part of the fraudulent Medicaid payments
that had been made to the defendant. At issue was whether Section
232(c) barred the district court from exercising subject matter jurisdic-
tion over the claim, when the information upon which the claim was
based was in the possession of the United States. 30 The Seventh Circuit
held that the unambiguous language of the statute barred subject matter
jurisdiction over such a claim, and that there was a strong presumption
against finding an exemption in the statute.
31
D. Social Security Act
In Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission v.
26. 730 F.2d at 1108.
27. "A qui tam action is one in which the plaintiff sues for himself on behalf of the government
to recover a penalty under a statute which provides that part of the penalty is awarded to the party
bringing the suit and the remainder of the penalty is awarded to the government." United States ex.
rel. Wisconsin v. Dean, 729 F.2d 1100, 1102 n.l (7th Cir. 1984).
28. The relevant part of the statute provided: "Unless the Government proceeds with the ac-
tion, the court shall dismiss an action brought by the person on discovering the action is based on
evidence or information the Government had when the action was brought." 31 U.S.C. § 232(c)
(1976), quoted in, 729 F.2d at 1101.
29. 729 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1984).
30. The court explained that "to exercise a private right of action" under § 232(c):
[T]he qui tam plaintiff must provide the United States Attorney General with a copy of the
complaint and a disclosure in writing of substantially all evidence and information in his
possession material to the effective prosecution of such suit, [citation omitted]. . . . The
plaintiff may maintain this action which even though the government declines to join un-
less 'it shall be made to appear that such suit was based upon evidence or information in
the possession of the United States ... ' (citations omitted).
729 F.2d at 1102.
31. Id. at 1104. See also, U.S. v. Aster, 275 F.2d 281 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 894
(1960); Pettis ex. rel. United States v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 577 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1978); 49
A.L.R. Fed. 847 (1980).
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Schweicker,32 the district court dismissed the Commission's complaint
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiffs had alleged subject
matter jurisdiction under § 205(g) of the Social Security Act. 33 The Act
provides in relevant part that "[a]ny individual, after any final decision of
the Secretary of [Health and Human Services] made after a hearing to
which he was a party. . . may obtain a review in [a] district court of the
United States .... -34 The Commission sought a judicial determination
of its social security coverage in advance of any claims for benefits. The
Seventh Circuit recognized that in order to uphold jurisdiction over the
Commission's suit, two issues would have to be resolved: (1) whether the
Commission was subject to a final decision of the Secretary under the
terms of § 205(g); and (2) whether the Commission was an individual
party to a hearing within the statutory language. The court found that
the finality requirement was met when the Secretary sent a letter to the
Commission saying that its employees were not covered by social secur-
ity, adding that "the Commission has no formal appeal rights under the
Social Security Act to [sic] this determination. ' 35 Because the Commis-
sion had exhausted its remedies within the agency, the court considered
this letter a final decision within the terms of the statute.
On the other hand, with respect to the standing requirement, the
court had to broadly construe the terms of § 205(g) in order to find that
the Commission was a party to the hearing within the meaning of that
section. The court analogized to private sector insurance disputes to find
standing:
A company that paid premiums year in and year out for group life
insurance for its employees and then was told by the insurance com-
pany that the policy had been cancelled would have standing to sue for
a declaration that it was still in force. [citation omitted] That is the
kind of interest the Disciplinary Commission has asserted in this
suit. . . . In these circumstances, the presumption of judicial review-
ability of administrative action, [citation omitted], argues strongly for
deeming the Commission an "individual" within the meaning of Sec-
tion 205(g), entitled to obtain judicial review of an administratively
final decision on coverage.
36
Even though this interpretation of "individual" strained the usual
meaning of the term, the court was willing to expand the scope of the
term because of the strong possibility that without such an interpreta-
32. 715 F.2d 282 (7th Cir. 1983).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1976).
34. Id.
35. 715 F.2d at 286.
36. Id. at 289; Cf Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 667 F.2d 1034, 1039-40
(D.C. Cir. 1981).
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tion, the Commission would have no other avenue of judicial review.
The court recognized that although arguably mandamus jurisdiction
might be available, a recent decision of the Seventh Circuit has narrowed
the scope of such jurisdiction. 37 Moreover, the court concluded that it is
more consonant with the Supreme Court's decision in Weinberger v.
Salfi38 to route judicial review through § 205(g), and not through manda-
mus or other avenues.
E. Diversity Jurisdiction
In Elston Investment, Ltd. v. David Altman Leasing Corp. ,39 the ju-
risdictional issue faced by the Seventh Circuit was whether the citizen-
ship of a limited partner is the citizenship of all partners (general and
limited) or only the general partners. Since this was an issue of first im-
pressions, the court examined the differing views of the issue taken by the
Second4° and Third Circuits. 41 The court rejected the Second Circuit's
position that for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction, only the citizen-
ship of the general partners should govern. Instead, the court adopted
the Third Circuit's rule that the citizenship of both limited and general
partners should determine the court's diversity jurisdiction. The Seventh
Circuit concluded that this rule was more consistent with the Supreme
Court's position that any change in the rules for determining diversity of
citizenship must come from Congress.
42
F. Federal Question Jurisdiction
In Woodstock/Kenosha Health Center v. Schweiker,43 the Seventh
Circuit held that the district court had federal question jurisdiction over
a challenge to a proposed Medicaid disallowance. Previously, the Sev-
enth Circuit had held that federal question jurisdiction does not confer
subject matter jurisdiction on the district court to decide the legality of a
Medicare disallowance. 4 The court recognized that case law had
"unambiguously [stated] that the Medicare review procedures are exclu-
37. See Americana Healthcare Corp. v. Schweiker, 688 F.2d 1072, 1084 (7th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1202 (1983).
38. 422 U.S. 749 (1975). In Salfi, the Court liberally interpreted the statute to allow alternative
avenues of review, not only mandamus. Id. at 764.
39. 731 F.2d 436 (7th Cir. 1984).
40. Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817
(1966).
41. Carlsberg Resource Corp. v. Cambria Say. & Loan Assn., 554 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1977).
42. See Navarro Savings Ass'n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458 (1980).
43. 713 F.2d 285 (7th Cir. 1983).
44. Id. at 288. The court cited two Supreme Court cases which ruled on this question. See
United States v. Erika, 456 U.S. 201 (1982); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
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sive and preclude the application of general federal jurisdiction. ' 45 Nev-
ertheless, in Woodstock, the court found that with respect to Medicaid
cases, there was no Congressional evidence to defeat the strong presump-
tion in favor of judicial review. 46 Accordingly, it held that federal ques-
tion jurisdiction vests the district court with subject matter jurisdiction in
Medicaid, but not Medicare cases.
Appellate Jurisdiction
The courts of appeals have exclusive appellate jurisdiction under
Sections 2321(a) and 2342(5) of the Judicial Code to review final orders
of the Interstate Commerce Commission (I.C.C.). 47 However, Congress
divided the review process by enacting 28 U.S.C. § 1336(a). 48 This pro-
vision gives the district courts jurisdiction to enforce or enjoin "any order
of the I.C.C. for the payment of money or the collection of fines, penal-
ties, and forfeitures. ' '49 This bifurcated review process gave rise to an
issue of appellate jurisdiction in Field Container Corporation v. I. C.C. 50
In Field Container, the Seventh Circuit had to decide whether it had ap-
pellate jurisdiction over an I.C.C. order commanding a shipper to pay a
demurrage charge of $19,000 to the C&NW railroad.
In deciding this issue, the court expressed displeasure with this divi-
sion in the appellate jurisdiction of the court of appeals. The court found
it anomalous that "the less important [order], the order for repayment of
money, gets an extra tier of review-review by a federal district court, in
addition to review by the court of appeals, and by the Supreme Court on
certiorari." 5' Consequently, the court construed § 1336(a) narrowly,
and found two grounds upon which to conclude that the district court
did not have appellate jurisdiction over this type of I.C.C. order. First, it
found the order to be within its appellate jurisdiction because the plain-
tiff's complaint sought a court order commanding the railroad to waive
the demurrage charge, which the court construed as a request for an in-
junction. Alternatively, since the plaintiff's complaint also alleged that
the demurrage charge was unreasonable, the court construed this allega-
tion as a request for partial cancellation of a tariff, a matter over which
45. 713 F.2d at 289.
46. Id.
47. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2321(a), 2342(5) (1981).
48. See C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 301 (1983), for an excellent brief synopsis of
the history of judicial review of ICC orders.
49. 28 U.S.C. § 1336(a) (1976).
50. 712 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1983).
51. Id. at 254.
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the court of appeals would have jurisdiction.5 2 Thus, the Seventh Circuit
concluded that this order did not fall within the ambit of § 1336(a), and
therefore the court of appeals had exclusive jurisdiction.
In Texaco Inc. v. Cottage Hill Operating Co.53 and Rohrer, Hibler &
Replogle, Inc. v. Perkins,54 the court(s) had to decide whether the Enlow-
Ettleson5 5 doctrine vested the court of appeals with appellate jurisdiction
over two orders, one denying a motion to remand (Perkins) and the other
denying a motion to dismiss or stay (Texaco). The Enlow-Ettleson doc-
trine is derived from two Supreme Court cases which followed the fusion
of law and equity.56 The doctrine acts as an exception to the terms of 28
U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), -5 7 governing appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory
orders. The essence of the doctrine is that a stay of proceedings, not
usually appealable under § 1292(a)(1), may be appealed when both of the
following conditions are met: (1) the underlying cause of action sounds
in law; and (2) the stay of proceedings was sought to permit the prior
determination of some equitable defense or counterclaim. 58 The doctrine
has been criticized as anchronistic, leading to inconsistency and
injustice. 59
The Seventh Circuit refused to extend the application of the doc-
trine in either Texaco or Perkins. In Texaco, the court determined that
the cause of action involved damages, and therefore sounded in law, but
the stay was brought to permit the prior determination of a legal, not an
equitable, defense. Therefore, the court held that the doctrine did not
apply, and accordingly, held that it did not have jurisdiction over the
district court's order. 6°
In Perkins, the court simply concluded that the doctrine did not
52. Id. at 255.
53. 709 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1983).
54. 728 F.2d 860 (7th Cir. 1984).
55. Id. at 863. The Rohrer court evidenced a great deal of reluctance to extend the doctrine
beyond the bounds approved by the Supreme Court.
56. Enlow v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379 (1935); Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 317 U.S. 188 (1942).
57. The statute provides in relevant part:
§ 1292. Interlocutory decisions
(a) The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction from:
(1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States, ... or of the
judges thereof, granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunc-
tions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct review
may be had in the Supreme Court.
58. See Hayes v. Allstate Ins. Co., 722 F.2d 1332, 1337-38 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., dissent-
ing). C. WRIGHT, § 102, writes very harshly of the rule: "If Congress were aware of the travail this
obsolete and fictional distinction is causing the courts of appeals, relief would surely be forthcoming
A rule that causes confusion at best and injustice at worst can hardly be justified."
59. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS at 710.
60. 709 F.2d at 754.
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apply because the plaintiff's motion was to remand the case to state
court, and that a remand was not the equivalent of a stay within the
terms of the doctrine. In addition, the court considered whether the col-
lateral order doctrine applied to this motion within the small exception
to the finality requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Under the collateral or-
der doctrine, the appellate court will review orders "which finally deter-
mine claims or rights separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in
the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the
cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the
whole case is adjudicated." ' 6 1 The doctrine has been narrowly construed
to insure that the finality requirement of § 1291 is not undermined. 62
The Seventh Circuit followed the Supreme Court's application of the
doctrine63 and concluded that since the district court's order denying
plaintiff's motion to remand was reviewable on final appeal, the collateral
order doctrine did not apply. The policy underlying this decision was
that cases should not be decided in a piecemeal fashion, and an interlocu-
tory appeal will be taken only under exceptional circumstances.
Another case concerned with this policy against "piecemeal ap-
peals" was Ivanov-McPhee v. Washington Nat. Ins. Co. 64 The plaintiff
brought an employment discrimination suit against Washington National
[WNI] and others. Ten suits were brought altogether, four naming WNI
as a defendant. On plaintiff's motion, the ten cases were consolidated for
purposes of discovery and trial, and a multiple count was filed. Never-
theless, separate docket sheets were maintained. Subsequently, the dis-
trict court dismissed all four suits against WNI. The plaintiff appealed
this dismissal without first obtaining certification under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 54(b). 65 The court considered the issue of
whether the dismissal of the four WNI suits was sufficiently separate to
warrant appellate jurisdiction without 54(b) certification. The court de-
61. Rohrer v. Perkins, 728 F.2d 860, 862 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 265
(1984), citing, Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
62. See Ruiz v. Estele, 609 F.2d 118, 119 (5th Cir. 1980); Minnesota v. Pickands Mather & Co.,
636 F.2d 251, 254-55 (8th Cir. 1980); Cullen v. N.Y.S. Civil Service Comm'n., 566 F.2d 846, 848 (2d
Cir. 1977); Rodgers v. U.S. Steel Corp., 541 F.2d 365, 369-71 (3d Cir. 1976).
63. Cooper & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978). The Court articulated the following
three criteria: "[T]he order must conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important
issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and be effectively unreviewable from a final
judgment." Id. at 468.
64. 719 F.2d 927 (7th Cir. 1983).
65. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b) provides in relevant part:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counter-
claim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court
may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims
or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and
upon an express direction for the entry of judgment . ...
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termined that this issue depends on the type of consolidation that has
taken place. That is, if several actions "are combined into one, lose their
separate identity, and become a single action in which a single judgment
is rendered," then 54(b) certification is a prerequisite to exercising appel-
late jurisdiction over the dismissal of any one of the suits.66 Applying
this principle to the present case, the court reasoned that, while the con-
solidation order did not state that the cases were consolidated for all pur-
poses, it could not "discern any purposes of substance for which they
retain separate identities. Their separate existences, if any, are confined
to the formalities of the docket sheets."' 67 Hence, the court held that
when consolidated cases maintain only formal distinctions, and a party's
interest will not be seriously prejudiced, Rule 54(b) certification must be
obtained before an appellate court will exercise jurisdiction. 68
In Minority Police Officers Ass'n of South Bend v. City of South
Bend,69 the court narrowly construed the range of issues which can be
appealed with 54(b) certification. The court considered the issue of
whether the district court's partial summary judgment on three issues
was separate, and therefore appealable under Rule 54(b). The Seventh
Circuit expressed the desire to "hold that claims were never separate for
Rule 54(b) purposes if they [arise] out of the same factual setting
.... "70 However, it recognized that the Supreme Court had rejected
this mechanical judicial test for determining the separateness of claims
under Rule 54(b). 71 Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit ruled that claims
will not be considered separate under 54(b) if "the facts they depend on
are largely the same, or, stated otherwise, if the only factual differences
are minor."' 72 Applying this test to the issues dismissed by the district
court's partial summary judgment, the court concluded that one issue
was not appealable under 54(b) because it raised facts which involved
66. 719 F.2d at 929, citing, 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 2382, at 254 (1971).
67. 719 F.2d at 930.
68. The court applied the rationale of Ringwald v. Harris, 675 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1982). The
court in Ringwald reasoned that:
While a consolidation may not in every respect merge separate actions into a single suit, we
see no reason why a proper consolidation may not cause otherwise separate actions to
thenceforth be treated as a single judicial unit for purposes of Rule 54(b) when the consoli-
dation is clearly unlimited and the actions could originally have been brought as a single
unit.
Id. at 771.
69. 721 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1983).
70. Id. at 200.
71. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 436 (1956).
72. Id. Earlier Seventh Circuit decisions have struggled with a workable test to apply when
factual allegations overlap. See, e.g., Local p. 171 Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Thompson Farms
Co., 642 F.2d 1065, 1070 (7th Cir. 1982). The MPOA test borders on the test rejected in Sears.
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essentially the same facts that might be involved in a future appeal; an-
other issue was held to be appealable because it concerned a different
class of people than those involved in the remaining suit. As to the third
claim, the court concluded that it was not a final determination, and
therefore could not be appealed under Rule 54(b).
73
Abstention Doctrine
Under a variety of special circumstances a federal district court will
"abstain" from exercising its Congressionally mandated jurisdiction over
a dispute, in deference to a parallel state court proceeding. The Seventh
Circuit decided three cases involving the abstention doctrine. The appar-
ent theme running through these three cases is a desire by the Seventh
Circuit to limit the scope of the federal forum. 74
A. Younger-Type Abstention
In Ciotti v. County of Cook,75 the Seventh Circuit concluded that
abstention was appropriate because the plaintiffs' federal action was "still
in an embryonic stage."' 76 The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality
of a zoning ordinance which designated their adult book store a "non-
conforming use." The plaintiffs were given a one year grace period to
comply with the ordinance. The plaintiff applied for a variance from the
ordinance which would have permitted them to continue operating.
Shortly after the Board of Zoning Appeals denied their request, the
plaintiffs filed a suit in federal district court. While the plaintiffs were
filing this action in federal district court, the county brought a quasi-
criminal action against them in state court, alleging that the plaintiffs
were still in violation of the ordinance.
77
After bringing its quasi-criminal action, the county sought dismissal
of the plaintiffs' federal action. The county argued that under the "ab-
stention doctrine" the federal district court should defer to the state
court proceeding involving the same issues. The federal district court
accepted this argument and dismissed the plaintiffs' action.78
73. 721 F.2d at 202.
74. See generally WRIGHT, supra note 48. See also infra note 88 and accompanying text.
75. 712 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1983).
76. Id. at 314. The Supreme Court in Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975), established the
formula for determining the dividing line in time for abstention: "Commencement of the federal
action is not the controlling date in determining whether a state action is pending. Instead, the
federal court is to make the determination when it is ready to commence 'proceedings of substance
on the merits.' " Id. at 349.
77. 712 F.2d at 313.
78. Id.
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On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that abstention was inappropriate
because the federal action was so far advanced as to preclude abstention.
In deciding this issue, the court followed the abstention doctrine as out-
lined in the Supreme Court's opinion in Younger v. Harris.79 Younger-
type abstention deals with the situation where the plaintiff is in federal
court challenging the constitutionality of a criminal statute, while the
state is prosecuting the plaintiff in state court for a violation of that stat-
ute. When the state proceedings commence after the filing of the federal
action, the district court will abstain only if two conditions are met:
(1) the state court proceedings will provide the federal plaintiff with an
adequate opportunity to raise his constitutional challenges; and (2) there
have been no proceedings of substance on the merits in federal court.
8 0
In Ciotti, both sides agreed that the quasi-criminal action would pro-
vide an adequate forum for the federal plaintiffs to raise their constitu-
tional objections. With respect to the advancement of the proceedings
question, the court ruled that since the district court had only decided
the preliminary issue of standing in the federal action, abstention was
appropriate. Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiffs' suit was not




In Waldron v. McAtee,8 2 the Seventh Circuit abstained from decid-
ing whether an Indianapolis loitering ordinance was unconstitutionally
vague, because a construction of the statute by the state court might
moot any constitutional challenge in federal court. In Waldron, the
plaintiff was threatened with arrest under an anti-loitering ordinance if
he was "ever again found late at night in the vicinity of either the library
or Monument Circle."'8 3 The plaintiff sued for declaratory and injunctive
relief in federal district court alleging that the application of the ordi-
nance violated his civil rights, and that on its face the ordinance was void
for vagueness under the First Amendment. The district court granted
defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissed plaintiff's
complaint.
79. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
80. See generally Theis, Younger v. Harris: Federalism in Context, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 103
(1981); Redish, The Doctrine of Younger v. Harris, Deference In Search of a Rationale, 33 CORNELL
L. REV. 463 (1978); Rosenfeld, The Place of State Courts in the Era of Younger v. Harris, 59 B. U. L.
REV. 597 (1979).
81. 712 F.2d at 314.
82. 723 F.2d 1348 (7th Cir. 1983).
83. Id. at 1350.
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On appeal, the Seventh Circuit raised the issue of abstention for the
first time.8 4 The court determined that this case was appropriate to apply
the abstention doctrine as outlined in Railroad Comm 'n v. Pullman Co. 
8 5
Under Pullman-type abstention, "a court abstains in order to avoid un-
necessary constitutional adjudication. . . . It is not seeking to protect
the rights of one of the parties; it is seeking to promote a harmonious
federal system by avoiding a collision between the federal courts and
state (including local) legislatures."
'8 6
Applying this principle to the present case, the court concluded that
since the ordinance in question was not irremedially vague, and had not
been construed by the Indiana state court, the federal court should ab-
stain from ruling on the plaintiff's case. The Seventh Circuit reasoned
that the state court might put a judicial gloss on the ordinance, rescuing
it from a challenge on the ground of unconstitutional vagueness. Under
such a construction, the ordinance might be inapplicable to plaintiff's
conduct, and therefore it could not violate his civil rights.
If the state court's construction of the ordinance voided both the
plaintiff's vagueness claim and his allegations of a civil rights violation,
the plaintiff's federal action would be moot, further justifying abstention
in this case. So as not to interfere with the state court's initial construc-
tion of its own ordinance, the Seventh Circuit concluded that abstention
was proper in this case.
8 7
The court dismissed the plaintiff's argument that abstention would
unduly burden his access to the federal courts. In this regard, the court
declared that:
[A]ccess to the federal courts is by no means guaranteed when a stat-
ute or ordinance is challenged as being unconstitutionally vague; and
certainly Waldron should not feel unfairly deprived by being forced to
litigate merely the applicability of the Indianapolis loitering ordinance
in the state courts of Indiana, being able to return if he wants to the
federal district courts to litigate any federal questions there.
88
In these few words, the court articulated a theme running through most
of the cases involving jurisdiction. That is, unless clearly mandated by
84. Id. at 1351.
85. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
86. 723 F.2d at 1351.
87. Id. See also, United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971). Under
this type of abstention, the Court in Babbitt v. UFWNU, 442 U.S. 289 (1979), stated that abstention
is appropriate when a state law can be "subject to an interpretation which will render unnecessary or
substantially modify the federal constitutional questions." Id. at 308.
88. 723 F.2d at 1353; Judge Swygert dissented from the majority opinion in Waldron primarily
because the majority required the plaintiff to exhaust his state court remedies, something not re-
quired in Pullman-type abstention. Id. at 1356.
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statute or judicial policy, the Seventh Circuit will strictly limit the range
of federal jurisdiction, with little regard for the hardships this may place
upon the plaintiff.
C. Colorado River Abstention
The Seventh Circuit found that "[n]one of the well-established ave-
nues for . . . abstention" supported the district court's decision to ab-
stain in Board of Educ. of Valley View v. Bosworth. 9 Nevertheless, the
court concluded that under Colorado River Water Conservation v. United
States,90 there were exceptional circumstances in this case which justified
staying the exercise of federal jurisdiction. The underlying dispute in
Bosworth involved the failure of the county tax office to distribute reve-
nues to certain local governmental units in Will County, Illinois. Arising
out of this dispute, one suit was filed in federal district court, and simul-
taneously, two similar suits were filed in state court. On the defendant's
motion to abstain, the district court ruled that abstention was appropri-
ate for three reasons: (1) the state court suits could furnish complete
relief on all the claims presented; (2) the federal proceedings had not
progressed beyond the filing of the complaint and motions to dismiss;
and (3) the case involved sensitive issues of local taxation. 9'
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit considered the lower court's ration-
ale for abstention that to compel distribution of collected taxes "is as
disruptive to state autonomy as suspending the collection of taxes."
'92
The court rejected this reasoning. Instead, it found that if the federal
district court decided this case, it would not interfere with the state's
sovereign functions because the plaintiffs did not seek to challenge the
tax system, but rather sought compliance with it. Nevertheless, the court
determined that abstention was appropriate on other grounds. It rea-
soned that since a consent had been entered which mooted most of the
issues in dispute and the remaining issues were close to settlement,
93
therefore under the "exceptional circumstances" of Colorado River, ab-
stention was appropriate.
89. 713 F.2d 1316 (7th Cir. 1983).
90. 424 U.S. 800 (1976). The Court stated that the existence of parallel proceedings may in
exceptional circumstances justify staying the exercise of jurisdiction. Such exceptional circum-
stances include the possibility of avoiding piecemeal adjudication, the extent to which the federal
proceedings have progressed, and the degree to which the rights at stake are peculiarly local. Id. at
818-20.
91. 713 F.2d at 1318-19.
92. Id. at 1319.
93. Id. at 1321-22.
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VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL
In Quad/Graphics, Inc. v. Fass,94 the court dealt with the issue of
when a voluntary dismissal of less than all the defendants to an action is
proper. In that case, Quad/Graphics sought to recover $1.5 million due
on various contracts with the corporate defendants. Quad/Graphics
named the corporate entities it had contracted with, as well as two prin-
cipals of those corporations. Individually named were Irving and Myron
Fass. Quad/Graphics sought to pierce the corporate veil and hold Myron
and Irving personally liable. Prior to the final adjudication of its lawsuit,
Quad/Graphics was able to reach a voluntary settlement with Irving
Fass.95 Over the objections of the remaining corporate and individual
defendants, the district court dismissed Irving from the lawsuit. Dismis-
sal was pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2). 96 In af-
firming this dismissal, the Seventh Circuit reiterated the standard to be
used when assessing the propriety of a Rule 41(a)(2) voluntary dismis-
sal.97 The court stated that in order to have standing to challenge the
voluntary dismissal of a co-defendant, 98 the non-settling party or parties
must "demonstrate plain legal prejudice," 99 not merely injury in fact.
The court noted that although the settlement agreement entered into be-
tween Irving and Quad/Graphics prevented him from "voluntarily par-
ticipat[ing] in the litigation,' t°0 he was vulnerable to "an appropriate
legal action . ..to determine the nature of his duty [to the corporate
defendants] and to compel him to perform it."I Consequently, the
court concluded that though this settlement agreement made the remain-
ing defendants' trial preparation more difficult, this difficulty did not rise
to the level of plain legal prejudice. '
0 2
94. 724 F.2d 1230 (7th Cir. 1983).
95. Settlement was pursuant to the district court's Decision and Order of September 9, 1982.
Id. at 1231.
96. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) provides in relevant part: "Except as provided in paragraph (1) of
this subdivision of this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs instance save upon
order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper."
97. See Stein v. Barnett, 452 F.2d 211, 213 (7th Cir. 1971), citing, 2B BARRON AND HOLTZOFF,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §912 (Wright ed. 1961) at 114 ("In exercising its discretion
the court follows the traditional principle that dismissal should be allowed unless the defendant will
suffer some plain legal prejudice.")
98. Analytically some commentators have expressed concern over utilizing Rule 41(a)(2) to
dismiss fewer than all claims or all parties. This concern is founded in the Rule's explicit language to
dismiss an action, not a claim. See 5 Moore's Federal Practice 41.06-1 (1982). Compare FED. R.
Civ. P. 4 1(b) which states in relevant part that defendants "may move for the dismissal of an action
or any claim."
99. 724 F.2d at 1233.
100. Id. at 1237.
101. Id. at 1234.
102. Id. The court noted that Irving's disinclination to participate in the lawsuit predated the
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INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL
In the 1983-84 term the Seventh Circuit handed down two decisions
which can conveniently be grouped together under the category of invol-
untary dismissal.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) allows a defendant, under cer-
tain circumstances, to move to have the claims against him involuntarily
dismissed. The following two cases respectively involve questions re-
garding the propriety of the district court's grant of a Rule 41(b) motion
for: (1) failure of a plaintiff to prosecute; and (2) failure of a plaintiff to
show any right to relief after the presentation of his evidence in a nonjury
trial.
In Stevens v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., °3 the Seventh Circuit affirmed
the district court's order dismissing plaintiffs suit under Rule 41(b) for
failure to prosecute. The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that involuntary
dismissal with prejudice is a severe sanction to be imposed only in ex-
treme circumstances. However, the court emphasized that this sanction
must be available to protect the interests of all litigants and to ensure that
the court system operates in an efficient manner."°4 A trial on the merits
is preferred, but where the plaintiffs conduct, viewed in its entirety, dem-
onstrates a lack of prosecutive intent, involuntary dismissal is
appropriate. 0 5
In this case the plaintiffs lawsuit had been pending for over four
years, and at the time of dismissal the district court had already granted
three continuances, two of which were necessitated by the plaintiff's fail-
ure to secure counsel and prepare for trial. On two occasions, the district
court instructed the plaintiff to secure replacement counsel. On Decem-
ber 14, 1981, the date the last continuance was granted, the district court
warned the plaintiff that if he was not prepared by the next agreed-upon
trial date, the district court would have no choice but to dismiss his suit.
Two-and-a-half months later the defendant served the plaintiff with a
notice to take his deposition and with a subpoena requesting the plaintiff
to bring with him copies of all documents he intended to submit as trial
exhibits. Two weeks before trial the plaintiff appeared at the deposition
without counsel and without copies of the requested documents. The
settlement agreement. Therefore, Irving's cooperation was not assured even if the agreement had
not been entered into.
103. 710 F.2d 1224 (7th Cir. 1983).
104. Id. at 1230.
105. 710 F.2d at 1228. The court relied extensively on its recent decision in Locasio v. Teletype
Corp., 694 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1982), which involved facts similar to those of Stevens. See 710 F.2d at
1228-29.
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next day the defendant moved to dismiss plaintiffs suit on two grounds,
including failure to prosecute under Rule 4 1(b).10 6 The court granted the
motion, and plaintiff appealed.
The Seventh Circuit ruled that, under the circumstances, the district
court did not abuse its discretion in granting defendant's Rule 41(b) mo-
tion two weeks prior to the scheduled date of trial. The court found that
with less than two weeks remaining before trial, the plaintiff's failure to
secure counsel and refusal to cooperate in trial preparation demonstrated
that it was a virtual certainty that the plaintiff would not be prepared for
trial on the scheduled trial date.107
Under Rule 41 (b), a court may dismiss a plaintiffs claim at the close
of the plaintiffs presentation of evidence if the plaintiff has shown no
right to relief under the facts and the law. Ekanem v. Health Hospital
Corp. of Marion City, Ind. 108 explored the application of this ground for
involuntary dismissal to Title VII actions.
In Ekanem, the district court had granted the defendants' Rule
41 (b) motion thereby dismissing the plaintiffs' individual and class claims
of employment discrimination. On appeal, the plaintiffs contended that
they had established a prima facia case of employment discrimination
and retaliation. Accordingly, they argued that they were entitled to have
the defendants present their evidence so that the plaintiffs would have a
full and fair opportunity to demonstrate that the defendants' reasons
were merely a pretext for discrimination and retaliation. This argument
was predicated on the three-step procedure for trying Title VII claims
outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.10 9 Under this three-step
procedure, the plaintiff presents his case and describes the defendant's
allegedly discriminatory acts, the defendant explains why its actions were
motivated by legitimate considerations, and then the plaintiff explains
why the defendant's purported reasons for its actions were merely a pre-
text for its discrimination. The plaintiffs' argument essentially was that
they were entitled to have this three-step procedure carried out.
The Seventh Circuit noted, however, that this three-step procedure
106. The defendant also moved to dismiss under Rule 37(b)(2)(C), which the district court also
granted. That rule provides that a suit may be dismissed if "a party ... fails to obey an order to
provide or permit discovery .... " FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C). On the appeal of this order, the
Seventh Circuit ruled that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's suit on the basis of Rule
37(b)(2)(C) since that rule has no application where there has been no court discovery order. 710
F.2d at 1228. Accord 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §2289
(1978).
107. See 710 F.2d at 1230.
108. 724 F.2d 563 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 93 (1984).
109. 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973).
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is not a rigid framework for trying Title VII actions.110 Rather, it serves
as a mere model for evaluating all of the evidence in a discrimination
suit."' It is not necessarily error, therefore, for a court to grant a Rule
41(b) motion at the close of the plaintiff's case." 12 The court next consid-
ered the specific application of Rule 41(b) to Title VII actions. It con-
cluded that dismissal is proper in two situations:" 13  (1) where the
plaintiff, at the close of his case-in-chief, has not demonstrated a prima
facia case of discrimination; and (2) where the record at the close of the
plaintiff's case contains the defendants' reasons for its actions and the
evidence is sufficient to support a judgment for the defendants.
In Ekanem, the trial record before the district court not only in-
cluded the defendant's statements but also included the transcript from a
prior hearing on whether to issue a preliminary injunction. 114 Thus, the
dismissal was not premature, and after reviewing all the evidence, the
Seventh Circuit concluded that the district court was not clearly in error
in finding that the plaintiffs had failed to sustain their burden of proof. "15
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Two decisions in the 1983-84 term addressed issues concerning sum-
mary judgment. In Gieringer v. Silverman," 16 a securities fraud case, the
issue on appeal was whether summary judgment was an appropriate res-
olution of a statute of limitations defense where: (1) the plaintiffs' knowl-
edge and diligence were in issue; and (2) the plaintiffs had filed a Rule
56(f) 17 motion in response to the defendants' motion for summary
judgment.
The Wisconsin statute of limitations required the plaintiffs to file
suit within one year of the date that they either knew or, in the exercise
of due diligence, should have known facts sufficient to put them on notice
of possible fraud. "1 From the plaintiffs' complaint and deposition, it was
110. 724 F.2d at 568.
111. Davis v. Weidner, 596 F.2d 726, 730 (7th Cir. 1979).
112. 724 F.2d at 568. See also, Gaballah v. Johnson, 629 F.2d 1191, 1200 (7th Cir. 1980).
113. 724 F.2d at 568.
114. The parties stipulated that the record from the preliminary injunction hearing was to be
part of the trial record here. Id.
115. Id. at 568-74.
116. 731 F.2d 1272 (7th Cir. 1984).
117. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(f) states that:
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the [summary judgment] motion
that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition,
the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit
affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make
such other order as is just.
118. See Wis. STATS. §551.59(5) (1979-80).
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clear that as of September, 1979 the plaintiffs knew of facts sufficient to
put them on notice of possible fraud.1 9 The plaintiffs, however, did not
bring their suit until July, 1981. On the basis of the plaintiffs' complaint
and deposition, the defendants moved for summary judgment. The
plaintiffs responded by filing a Rule 56(f) motion, contending that further
discovery was needed in order for them to counter the defendants' mo-
tion. Ultimately, the district court denied the plaintiffs' Rule 56(f) mo-
tion and granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. 20
In affirming the district court decision, the Seventh Circuit rejected
several arguments proffered by the plaintiffs. The court stated that sum-
mary judgment is a proper way to dispose of a statute of limitations de-
fense where the dispositive issue is the plaintiffs' state of mind. t2' In
addition, the court ruled that further discovery was not needed before the
lower court ruled on the summary judgment motion. 22 The plaintiffs
had failed to adequately demonstrate how further discovery could help
them in resisting summary judgment. The court emphasized that this
was not a case where the facts needed to defeat summary judgment were
in the movants' (defendants') possession. 2 Rather, the plaintiffs them-
selves were the only parties that could possibly possess the information
needed to counter a summary judgment motion predicated on the plain-
tiffs' own complaint and deposition. Finally, the Seventh Circuit rejected
the plaintiffs' contention that they never had an opportunity to respond
to the defendants' summary judgment motion.' 24 The defendants' mo-
119. 539 F. Supp. 498, 502 (E.D. Wis. 1982).
120. Id. at 498.
121. 731 F.2d at 1277. The plaintiffs argued that summary judgment was an improper method
of disposing of statute of limitations issues in securities cases. The Seventh Circuit rejected this
absolute proposition. It acknowledged that several securities cases in the Seventh Circuit had held
that summary judgment was inappropriate where the defendant's motive and intent was in issue.
See, e.g., Staren v. American National Bank & Trust Co., 529 F.2d 1257, 1261 (7th Cir. 1976);
Tomera v. Gait, 511 F.2d 504, 510 (7th Cir. 1975). However, the court explained that the rationale
of these decisions rested not in the fact that they were securities cases but in the realization that
issues of the defendant's motive and intent cannot be resolved prior to complete discovery, and
usually, a trial on the merits. 731 F.2d at 1277. On the other hand, the court noted that several
cases in this circuit have demonstrated that summary judgment may be appropriate where the issue
is the plaintiffs due diligence in discovering facts underlying the securities claim. See, e.g., Turner v.
First Wisconsin Mortgage Trust, 454 F. Supp. 899, 907 (E.D. Wis. 1978); Cahill v. Ernst & Ernst,
448 F. Supp. 84, 88 (E.D. Wis.), vacated, 588 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1978), on remand, 478 F. Supp.
1186, 1191 (E.D. Wis. 1979), afld, 625 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1980). See also, Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry,
Rail, Barber & Ross, 472 F. Supp. 402, 410 (D. Colo. 1979), affd, 651 F.2d 687 (10th Cir.) (col-
lected cases at 692 n.9), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981). Since the district court had determined
that the dispositive factor in the statute of limitations dispute was the plaintiffs' state of mind, the
Seventh Circuit ruled that summary judgment was available to the defendants in this case. 731 F.2d
at 1277.
122. 731 F.2d at 1278.
123. See Costlow v. United States, 552 F.2d 560, 564 (3d Cir. 1977).
124. 731 F.2d at 1280.
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tion had been pending before the district court for over six months, and
the plaintiffs' submissions during that time, while intended to be confined
to the Rule 56(f) motion, clearly also addressed the merits of the defend-
ants' motion for summary judgment. The court noted that merely filing
a Rule 56(t) motion does not automatically stay the proceedings on the
underlying summary judgment motion. 
125
In Gracyalny v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,1 2 6 the Seventh Circuit
commented upon the availability of summary judgment in negligence
and strict tort liability cases. Here appeal was taken from an order of the
district court granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment. In
reversing the district court's order, the Seventh Circuit expressed its view
that summary judgment is rarely appropriate in tort actions. 127 In negli-
gence cases, factual issues concerning the reasonableness of parties' con-
duct, foreseeability and proximate cause are best resolved by a jury.
128
Similarly, in strict tort liability cases, whether a product is defective and
unreasonably dangerous to the user may be an issue of material fact pre-
cluding summary judgment. In Gracyalny, numerous issues of material
fact were present, and therefore the Seventh Circuit concluded that the




In Dundee Cement Co. v. Howard Pipe & Cement Products, Inc. ,130
the Seventh Circuit considered the propriety of the district court's entry
of a default judgment without a hearing. 3 1 The default judgment was
entered against four of the six remaining defendants for their repeated
failure to answer the complaint. Significantly, no hearing was held prior
to the entry of default. On appeal, the defendants contended that the
district court's failure to hold a hearing was an abuse of discretion. Spe-
cifically, they argued that the district court should have conducted a
125. Id.
126. 723 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1983).
127. Id. at 1316, quoting Hughes v. American Jawa, Ltd., 529 F.2d 21, 23 (8th Cir. 1976).
Under FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c), summary judgment for a defendant is proper only "if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the. . . [defendant] is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law."
128. 723 F.2d at 1316.
129. Id. at 1322.
130. 722 F.2d 1319 (7th Cir. 1983).
131. FED. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2) reads in pertinent part that '[i]f, in order to enable the court to
enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is necessary. . . to determine the amount of damages or
to establish the truth of any averment by evidence . . . . the court may conduct" a hearing.
290
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hearing to require the plaintiffs to prove: (1) the factual allegations relat-
ing to liability; and (2) the amount of damages allegedly suffered.
The court of appeals rejected the argument that the plaintiff was
required to prove its factual allegations relating to liability. The court
ruled that upon default the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint re-
lating to liability are automatically taken to be true.1 32 In Dundee Ce-
ment, the defendants made no specific challenge to the allegations of the
plaintiff's complaint. Further, the court could not say that the allega-
tions were not well-pleaded, that they were incapable of proof, or that
they were unsupported by or in conflict with the exhibits offered as sup-
port. Given this situation, the court found that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in not conducting a hearing on the plaintiffs' allega-
tions relating to liability.
The court took a different position, however, on the allegations re-
lating to the amount of damages suffered. These allegations are not ordi-
narily taken to be true without proof.133 Thus, the Seventh Circuit ruled
that a default judgment may not be entered without a hearing on dam-
ages.1 34 There are exceptions however. A prior hearing will not be re-
quired where the amount claimed is liquidated or is capable of definite
calculation from figures contained in documentary evidence or detailed
affidavits. 135 In this case, damages relating to three counts of the plain-
tiff's complaint were liquidated. But as for the plaintiff's fraud count, the
district court should have held a hearing to require specific proof of dam-
ages. The Seventh Circuit found that the district court's failure to do so
was an abuse of discretion.
The final issue raised by this case was whether default judgment
against fewer than all the named defendants was proper where liability
was joint and several. 136 The Seventh Circuit ruled that it was proper, as
long as a damages hearing was not required. t 37 But where a damages
hearing is required, it may not be held until the liability of each defend-
132. 722 F.2d at 1323. See Breuer Electric Mfg. Co. v. Toronado Systems of America, Inc., 687
F.2d 182, 186 (7th Cir. 1982) ("default judgment establishe[s], as a matter of law, that defendants
[are] liable to plaintiff as to each cause of action alleged in the complaint.")
133. 722 F.2d at 1323. See Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1 (1944); Geddes v. United Financial
Group, 559 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1977).
134. 722 F.2d at 1323.
135. See. e.g., United Artists Corp. v. Freeman, 605 F.2d 854, 857 (5th Cir. 1979); Geddes v.
United Financial Group, 559 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1977); Eisler v. Stritzler, 535 F.2d 148 (1st Cir.
1976); see also, 6 J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 55.07 (2d
ed. 1983).
136. 722 F.2d at 1324.
137. Id. This ruling was a mere restatement of the court's holding in In re Uranium Antitrust
Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980).
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ant has been resolved.1 38 The policy behind this rule is the desirability of
avoiding inconsistent damages awards on a single claim involving joint
and several liability.
CLASS ACTIONS
The Seventh Circuit decided two cases of note involving class ac-
tions. Both cases focused on the prerequisites for maintaining a class
action under Rule 23.139 In the first case, the plaintiffs were unable to
meet all the prerequisites for maintaining a class action, and accordingly
the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decertification of the
class.140 However, in the second case the Seventh Circuit liberally con-
strued the class action prerequisites, and affirmed the district court's cer-
tification of the plaintiffs as a class.
41
In Hewitt v. Joyce Beverages of Wisconsin, Inc.,142 the plaintiffs rep-
resented a class of wholesale distributors for defendant's soda. They
brought suit against the defendant alleging that it had coerced the dis-
tributors to comply with its scheme to fix soda prices. Initially, the dis-
trict court granted class certification, but on defendant's motion for a
rehearing, the court decertified the class.143
The plaintiffs argued on appeal that since they could prove that
Joyce had a comprehensive policing policy, pursuant to its price fixing
scheme, this should suffice to demonstrate an antitrust violation with re-
spect to each class member. However, the court rejected this argument
because the plaintiffs had failed to allege that "each distributor was sub-
jected to at least one of the alleged policing practices. ' ' 44 The court con-
cluded that without such an allegation the plaintiffs' complaint failed to
satisfy the Rule 23(b)(3)1 45 requirement that common questions of fact
138. 722 F.2d at 1324. See Uranium, 617 F.2d at 1262.
139. The rule reads in relevant part:
(a) Prerequisite to Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as
representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder
of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims
or defenses of the class ...
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if the
prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(3) the court finds that questions of law or fact common to members of the class
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. . ..
140. Hewitt v. Joyce Beverages of Wisconsin, Inc., 721 F.2d 625 (7th Cir. 1983).
141. La Fuente v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 713 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1983).
142. 721 F.2d 625 (7th Cir. 1983).
143. 721 F.2d at 626.
144. Id. at 628.
145. See supra note 139.
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predominate. 146
The Seventh Circuit upheld the plaintiffs' class certification in La
Fuente v. Stokely- Van Camp. t47 The underlying dispute involved the
failure of a farm labor contractor to make detailed disclosures to migrant
workers concerning the terms and conditions of their employment at the
time that they were recruited. The plaintiffs filed a four-count class ac-
tion complaint alleging that this failure to make disclosures violated the
terms of the Farm Labor Contractors Act (FLCA). t48 After a brief
bench trial, the district court found that the defendant's actions violated
the terms of the FLCA, and ordered future compliance with the statute
and compensatory money damages to the plaintiff class.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the district court had incor-
rectly concluded that the Rule 23 condition for class certification was
met. In particular, the defendant argued that the representative's claims
or defenses were not typical of the claims or defenses of the class as re-
quired by Rule 23(a)(3). 149 In order to determine "typicality," the court
recognized that it was necessary to decide whether the named representa-
tives' claims had the same essential characteristics as the claims of the
class as a whole. The court determined that this condition would be
satisfied if two tests were met: (1) the claim arose from the conduct that
gave rise to the claims of the other class members; and (2) the claims
were based on the same legal theory. As a general matter, the court
found that similarity of legal theories may control even in the face of
factual differences. ' 50
Applying these tests to the case at bar, the Seventh Circuit found the
named plaintiffs claim to be sufficiently "typical" of the claims of the
class as a whole. Specifically, the court found that even though some of
the class representatives had only worked for Stokely for a brief time, the
violative practices had "remained essentially unchanged throughout the
years in question," and the practices "affected in the same way anyone
who came to work for [Stokely]."'' 5 Accordingly, the court concluded
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the class.
146. 721 F.2d at 629.
147. 713 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1983).
148. 7 U.S.C. § 2041 et. seq. (1981).
149. See supra note 94.
150. See also, Edmundson v. Simon, 86 F.R.D. 375, 381 (N.D. I11. 1980); Resnick v. American
Dental Ass'n, 90 F.R.D. 530, 539 (N.D. I11. 1981); H. NEWBERG, CLASS ACTIONS §§ IlI0a, 1115,
1115c at 180-81, 186.
151. 721 F.2d at 232. On this point, the court liberally read the language of Tidwell v.
Schweiker, 677 F.2d 560, 565 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 905 (1983).
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INTERVENTION
In two cases decided by the Seventh Circuit involving intervention,
the court provided a useful exposition of the law in this area. Although
the two cases are similar in certain important respects, the results are
directly opposite. In one case the rights and interests of the intervenor
were adequately protected, and therefore, intervention was held not nec-
essary. In the other case, the court held that, because of competing inter-
ests and inadequate judicial safeguards, the proposed intervenor's rights
and interests were not protected; accordingly, the intervenor's motion
was granted.
In CFTC v. Heritage Capital Advisory Services, Ltd. ,152 Saelens Bev-
erages appealed from the district court's denial of its motion to intervene,
as a matter of right. Saelens sought to intervene in the underlying com-
modities enforcement action to impose a constructive trust on its em-
ployees' pension fund which had been delivered to the defendants for
investment purposes. Prior to this motion, the court appointed a receiver
to take control of all of the defendants' assets, and temporarily enjoined
from continuing to invest or otherwise disburse these assets. Subse-
quently, by agreement of the parties, the court made this arrangement
permanent. 1
53
The court considered two related issues on appeal: (1) whether dis-
position of the main action without Saelens as a party would impair its
interest in the Heritage funds, and (2) whether the CFTC could ade-
quately represent Saelins so that intervention would be unnecessary.
With respect to the first issue, the court noted that Saelens had two alter-
native forums to press its constructive trust claim besides the main cause
of action. First, Saelens could assert its claim under the receiver's claims
procedure subject to district court supervision. Alternatively, Saelens
could sue the receiver directly for wrongfully holding Saelens' assets.'
54
However, the court recognized that the availability of alternative forums
for relief is not always sufficient to justify denial of an intervenor's mo-
tion. That is, if the proposed intervenor's interest might still be
prejudiced without direct participation in the main action, the motion to
intervene should be granted despite alternative avenues of relief. 5 5 Nev-
152. 736 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984).
153. Id. at 386.
154. Id. at 387.
155. Id. See also, Central States v. Old Security Life Ins. Co., 600 F.2d 671, 677 (7th Cir. 1979);
Clark v. Sandusky, 205 F.2d 915, 919 (7th Cir. 1953); Brookins v. South Bend Community School
Corp., 95 F.R.D. 407, 409-10 (N.D. Ind. 1982), affd, 710 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, -
U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 1707 (1984).
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ertheless, the court concluded that no such prejudice would result in this
case because any disbursement decision would be subject to district court
approval. 1
56
In the alternative, Saelens argued on appeal that the CFTC could
not adequately represent its interests because Schaumburg Bank had filed
a motion in the district court seeking release, under an assignment the-
ory, of most of the defendant's funds to it rather than to the receiver.
The court found this argument to be without merit because Schaum-
burg's motion had been denied. Furthermore, even if the bank's motion
had been granted, the court found that the CFTC was an adequate repre-
sentative for three reasons: (1) Saelens had made no showing of collusion
between the CFTC and Schaumburg; (2) the CFTC's opposition to
Schaumburg's motion was not adverse to Saelens; and (3) there was no
indication that the CFTC had failed to fulfill its duty in prosecuting the
suit against Heritage. Hence, the court affirmed the district court's de-
nial of Saelens' motion to intervene.
157
In Lake Investors Development Group, Inc. v. Egidi Development
Group,158 the proposed intervenor, Peterson, petitioned the district court
to allow him to intervene in the Lake-Egidi action; he claimed an im-
pairable security interest in the land involved in the disputed real estate
transaction. The action in Lake involved a suit by the buyer against the
seller for specific performance, and the balance still owed on the land sale
contract. Peterson based his petition on a security interest that he had
acquired from the bank which had financed the transaction. The district
court denied Peterson's petition to intervene primarily on the ground
that a security interest had not been validly assigned.
159
In order to decide whether the district court erred in denying Peter-
son's petition to intervene, the Seventh Circuit analyzed the facts of Lake
in light of the three criteria for intervention articulated in Meridian
Homes Corp. v. Nicholas W. Prassas & Co.:16° (1) the proposed inter-
venor must have an interest in the underlying cause of action; (2) this
interest must be subject to a potential impairment; and (3) the plaintiff
must be an inadequate representative to protect this interest. Generally,
the court stated that when a court rules on a petition to intervene, all
non-conclusory allegations must be accepted as true. Furthermore, the
petition should not be denied unless it appears that the intervenor is not
156. 736 F.2d at 387.
157. Id.
158. 715 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1983).
159. Id. at 1258.
160. 683 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1982).
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entitled to relief under any set of facts alleged.' 61
Applying this liberal standard of construction to the proposed inter-
venor's petition, the court found that he had a viable "interest" in the
main action, and accordingly reversed the district court's finding on this
point. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that under the facts alleged in the
proposed intervenor's petition, it was possible to show a "significantly
protectable" interest, thereby satisfying the Supreme Court's requirement
for "interest" in this context. 162 Moreover, since the alleged security in-
terest arose directly from the disputed land sale contract, the interest was
"direct and substantial," satisfying this additional requirement for inter-
est under Meridian Homes. 1
63
With respect to the issue of impairment of right, the court followed
the Meridian Homes definition. Specifically, "impairment of right exists
if the decision of a legal question would, as a practical matter, foreclose
rights of a proposed intervenor in a subsequent proceeding: foreclosure
is to be measured in terms of stare decisis."' 64 Under this definition, the
Seventh Circuit concluded that the proposed intervenor clearly could
demonstrate impairment because final judgment on the land sale contract
would extinguish his rights.
165
Finally, on the issue of the adequacy of the plaintiff's representation,
the court ruled that since the plaintiff had no interest in "paying any
portion [of the settlement] to Peterson,"' 166 he could not adequately rep-
resent Peterson's security interest. In addition, the court recognized that
after the expense of litigation, the contract settlement might be inade-
quate to meet both the intervenor's and the plaintiff's claims. Under this
scenario, the plaintiff and the proposed intervenor would be competitors
for the same fund, and therefore, the plaintiff's representation would nec-
essarily be inadequate.
167
161. See Central States, 600 F.2d at 679; accord United States v. AT&T, 642 F.2d 1285, 1291
(D.C. Cir. 1980).
162. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 531 (1971); See also Cascade Nat. Gas Corp. v.
El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 135 (1967).
163. 683 F.2d at 204.
164. Id., citing, Atlantis Development Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818, 826-29 (5th Cir.
1967).
165. Lake, 715 F.2d at 1260.
166. Id. at 1261.
167. Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. City of St. Louis, 497 F.2d 957, 958 (8th Cir. 1974).
The court found the plaintiff an inadequate representative for the proposed intervenor because the
plaintiff's primary defense was to prove his priority to the fund in question, thus competing against
the proposed intervenor's claim.
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RES JUDICATA
In Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms, Inc., t68 the Sev-
enth Circuit held that once a court determines that it does not have sub-
ject matter jurisdiction, any other finding made by the court is
superfluous and will not have res judicata consequences.
169
The plaintiff had brought a prior action against the same defend-
ants.170 This prior action was dismissed by the district court after the
defendants filed motions under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
and 12(b)(6).171 The plaintiff subsequently filed a second suit against the
defendants based on the same alleged scheme. The defendants moved to
dismiss the second suit on several grounds, including preclusion by res
judicata. In reviewing the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's first
suit, the Seventh Circuit noted that the district court's memorandum
opinion, while ultimately dismissing the suit for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, also negatively commented upon the merits of the plaintiff's
Robinson-Patman Act claim. 172 Because of this superfluous commentary,
the defendants argued that the prior action's dismissal was on the merits,
thereby precluding the plaintiff from bringing the second suit.
73
The Seventh Circuit rejected the defendants' argument. The court
emphasized that in the prior suit the district court did not dismiss some
counts for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and others for failure to
168. 713 F.2d 1272 (7th Cir. 1983).
169. Id. at 1279.
170. See Bunker Ramo Corp. v. Cywan, 511 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Il1. 1981).
171. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) provides in pertinent part: "the following defenses may at the option
of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. . . . [and] (6)
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted .. "
172. 713 F.2d at 1276-77. The district court determined that the plaintiff was not in competition
with the defendant-corporation and therefore lacked standing to sue under section 2(c) of the Robin-
son-Patman Act. See 511 F. Supp. at 534.
173. A valid final judgment on the merits is res judicata and is a complete bar to a later lawsuit
between the same parties on the same cause of action. Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie,
452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981); Harper Plastics, Inc. v. Amoco Chemicals Corp., 657 F.2d 939, 943-45
(7th Cir. 1981). A dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not a dismissal on the merits
and thus will not bar a later suit. In contrast, dismissal for failure to state a claim is a dismissal on
the merits and thus will bar a later suit. Castello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 284-88 (1961).
Federated Department Stores, 452 U.S. at 399 n.3. In dismissing the first lawsuit, the district court
assumed that the plaintiffs lack of standing meant that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. See 511
F. Supp. at 534. Other courts have disposed of antitrust claims for plaintiffs' lack of standing on the
ground of failure to state a claim (Rule 12(b)(6)), rather than lack of subject matter jurisdiction
(Rule 12(b)(l)). See, e.g., Computer Statistics, Inc. v. Blair, 418 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D. Tex. 1976);
George Sales Co. v. Cool Attic Corp., 587 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1979). As a threshold matter, one
might question whether the district court acted properly in dismissing the suit on jurisdictional
grounds. However, the defendants "admitted" that the district court was correct in dismissing the
suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See 713 F.2d at 1277. Thus, the Seventh Circuit never
addressed the issue.
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state a claim. 174 Rather, the district court dismissed a single claim on
mixed grounds. In such a situation, a court's finding that it does not
have subject matter jurisdiction will control. 175  The court stated:
"[o]nce a court expresses the view that it lacks jurisdiction, the court
thereafter does not have the power to rule on any other matter ...
Any finding made by a court when the court has determined that it does
not have subject matter jurisdiction carries no res judicata
consequences."1
76
In Wakeen v. Hoffman House, Inc.,177 the main issue confronting
the Seventh Circuit was whether the plaintiff's adverse state court deci-
sion, itself an appeal from a state administrative order, barred his Title
VII claim under the Supreme Court decision of Kremer v. Chemical Con-
struction Corp. 178
The plaintiff had filed discrimination charges against his former em-
ployer with both the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) and the Wisconsin Department of Industry, Labor and Human
Relations (DILHR). The EEOC deferred to the DILHR for sixty days.
Thereafter, the DILHR dismissed the plaintiff's complaint, and the
plaintiff sought appellate review in the Circuit Court of Dane County.
The state court found that the defendants' allegedly discriminatory ac-
tions were involuntary in that they were undertaken in response to a di-
rect order from the DILHR. 179 In affirming the DILHR's dismissal, the
state court held that the involuntary nature of the defendants' actions
absolved them from all liability for discrimination under the Wisconsin
Fair Employment Act.18 0
The plaintiff then brought this Title VII class action in federal dis-
trict court. The court eventually granted the defendants' motion for
summary judgment on the ground that, under Kremer, the plaintiff's fed-
eral suit was barred as res judicata.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Kremer arose from a proce-
dural background strikingly similar to that of the present action. In
Kremer, the Supreme Court rejected an argument that Title VII created
174. If it had, then those counts dismissed for failure to state a claim would be barred by res
judicata. See Harper Plastics, Inc. v. Amoco Chemicals Corp., 657 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1981).
175. 713 F.2d at 1279.
176. Id. See also Madden v. Perry, 264 F.2d 169 (7th Cir. 1959).
177. 724 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1983).
178. 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
179. The DILHR order was issued pursuant to a Wisconsin protective law in effect at the time.
See Wis. STAT. §103.02 (1971) (amended 1975); Wis. ADMIN. CODE § IND. 74.03 (1971).
180. WIS. STAT. §§ 111.31-111.395 (1971) (current version at Wis. STAT. §§ 111.31-111.37
(1979-80)).
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an exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1738.181 The Court held that § 1738 requires
a federal court in a Title VII action to give preclusive effect to a state
court decision upholding a state administrative agency's rejection of an
employment discrimination claim when: (1) the state's own courts
would accord the decision preclusive effect; and (2) the procedures fol-
lowed by the state court satisfy the requirements of due process.
182
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, the plaintiff conceded that Wis-
consin's courts would accord the circuit court's decision preclusive effect,
and also admitted that he was accorded due process in the state court.
Nevertheless, the plaintiff sought to escape Kremer by arguing that it
should not extend to a case where the application of state law and Title
VII would yield different results on identical operative facts.18 3 He con-
tended that the defense to discrimination under the Wisconsin statute
was inadequate under Title VII, and thus the prior state suit should not
preclude his later federal action under Title VII.
The Seventh Circuit responded by asserting that the plaintiff should
have raised the Title VII issue in the state court proceeding.'8 4 Res judi-
cata, said the court, extends not only to issues that were raised in the
prior proceeding, but also to issues that could have been raised. 8 5 Since
both the state and federal actions involved the same operative facts, the
plaintiff's federal suit was an impermissible attempt to relitigate the same
cause of action. The court said that merely because a potential response
to the defense was based on federal law did not mean that the plaintiff
could bring a separate federal action to assert that response. 186 Once
having decided to litigate in state court, the plaintiff should have argued
to the state court that the agency's order was incorrect because it was
contrary to an applicable federal law. The court said that its result
181. 28 U.S.C. §1738 provides in pertinent part:
The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any . . . State . . . shall have the
same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and
Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State . . . from which they
are taken.
182. 456 U.S. at 481; accord Unger v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 693 F.2d 703 (7th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1102 (1983).
183. The Seventh Circuit did note that this line of analysis has recently been followed by the
Southern District of New York. See Reynolds v. New York State Department of Correction Serv-
ices, 568 F. Supp. 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that an adverse state court ruling should not pre-
clude the bringing of a subsequent federal action where the federal and state laws, though facially
similar, may yield different results as applied to a particular situation). While noting the existence of
this decision, however, the Seventh Circuit declined to follow it.
184. 724 F.2d at 1241, 1243.
185. See, e.g., Kremer, 456 U.S. at 465 n.4; Allen v. McCurry, 499 U.S. 90, 94 (1980); Lee v. City
of Peoria, 685 F.2d 196, 199 (7th Cir. 1982).
186. 724 F.2d at 1241. Cf Lee, 685 F.2d at 200; Miller-Wohl Co. v. Commissioner of Labor &
Industry, 685 F.2d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 1982).
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
would not be altered even if it assumed, as the plaintiff contended, that
the state court could not entertain an original Title VII complaint in
reviewing the state agency's action. 187 Citing a Wisconsin statutory pro-
vision,188 the Seventh Circuit found that, notwithstanding that assump-
tion, it was certainly within the state court's power to hear a claim that
the agency's order was incorrect because it allowed a result contrary to
federal law.
The Seventh Circuit in Wakeen cited several negative consequences
that would flow from an adoption of the plaintiff's argument. First, it
would require federal courts to conduct a much more focused inquiry
before according preclusive effect to the state court decision. Federal
courts would have to determine whether the state and federal laws in
question, though similar on their face, are truly coextensive when applied
to the point in issue.18 9 This type of inquiry would effectively nullify
Kremer and frustrate the purposes behind § 1738 and traditional theories
of res judicata and collateral estoppel.190 Secondly, the court suggested
that allowing such an exception to Kremer would detrimentally affect the
quality of adjudication at the state level. Quoting from Kremer, 91 the
Seventh Circuit expressed its concern that depriving state judgments of
finality would: (1) discourage full participation of the parties and search-
ing review by state officials; (2) violate principles of comity and federal-
ism; and (3) reduce the state's incentive to develop effective systems to
combat discrimination.
RELIEF FROM JUDGMENTS
C.K.S. Engineers, Inc. v. White Mountain Gypsum Co. 192 is the first
of four decisions focusing on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), Re-
lief from Judgments. The issue in this case was whether the district court
187. There is some uncertainty as to whether federal courts possess exclusive jurisdiction over
Title VII actions. Undoubtedly, Congress intended federal courts to be the main mechanism of
judicial enforcement; however, the grant of jurisdiction in 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(f)(1) is not, by its
terms, exclusive. For different views on the matter, compare Patzer v. Board of Regents of the
University of Wisconsin System, 577 F. Supp. 1553, 1558-59 (W.D. Wis. 1984), and Bennun v.
Board of Governors of Rutgers University, 413 F. Supp. 1274, 1279 (D.N.J. 1976) (Title VII juris-
diction not exclusively vested in federal courts), with Dickinson v. Chrysler Corp., 456 F. Supp. 43,
47-48 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (federal courts possess exclusive jurisdiction over Title VII actions).
188. WIs. STAT. § 227.20(8) reads in pertinent part: "The court should reverse or remand the
case to the agency if it finds that the agency's exercise of discretion is . in violation of a constitu-
tional or statutory provision."
189. 724 F.2d at 1242.
190. The court cited four of those purposes as follows: "[(1)] relieving parties from the cost and
vexation of multiple lawsuits; [(2)] conserving judicial resources; [(3)] fostering reliance on adjudica-
tion; and [(4)] promoting comity between state and federal courts." 724 F.2d at 1242.
191. See 456 U.S. at 478.
192. 726 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1984).
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erred in refusing to grant the defendants' Rule 60(b) motion to vacate a
default judgment. The decision is significant because it clarifies how
Rule 60(b) applies to default judgments in the Seventh Circuit.
The general rule in the Seventh Circuit is that relief from a judg-
ment under Rule 60(b) is an extraordinary remedy that should be
granted only in exceptional circumstances. 193 But there also is a policy
in the Seventh Circuit that a trial on the merits is favored over a default
judgment.' 94 The question has thus arisen whether default judgments
are to be treated more leniently under Rule 60(b) than other
judgments. 195
In C.K.S. Engineers the Seventh Circuit essentially answered that
question in the negative. After reviewing the case law, the court con-
cluded that "rule 60(b) is applied liberally in the default judgment con-
text only in the exceptional circumstance where the events contributing
to the default judgment have not been within the meaningful control of
the defaulting party, or its attorney."' 96 Thus, where the defaulting
party's action or inaction is wilfull or the result of unexcused negligence
or carelessness, the default judgment will not be vacated.
97
The court in C.K.S. Engineers acknowledged that a default judg-
ment is a harsh sanction and that a trial on the merits is preferred. Yet,
against these considerations, the court balanced the need to promote effi-
cient litigation and to be fair to all litigants.1 98 Those who diligently
pursue their cases should not be hindered by those who do not.' 99 In the
court's view, one of the primary purposes behind the default judgment is
to deter irresponsible conduct in litigation.2° To ensure that the default
judgment is an effective deterrent, however, relief under Rule 60(b) must
193. Planet Corp. v. Sullivan, 702 F.2d 123, 125 (7th Cir. 1983); Ben Sager Chemicals Interna-
tional v. E. Targosz & Co., 560 F.2d 805, 809 (7th Cir. 1977).
194. United States v. An Undetermined Quantity of Article of Drug Labeled as Benylin Cough
Syrup, 583 F.2d 942, 946 (7th Cir. 1972); Scarver v. Allen, 457 F.2d 308, 310 (7th Cir. 1972).
195. Some of the Seventh Circuit's own decisions have suggested that Rule 60(b) is to be applied
more liberally to default judgments. See Ellingsworth v. Chrysler, 665 F.2d 180, 185 (7th Cir. 1981);
Textile Banking Co. v. Rentschler, 657 F.2d 844, 854 (7th Cir. 1981); Dormeyer Co. v. M.J. Sales &
Distributing Co., 461 F.2d 40, 43 (7th Cir. 1972). CKS. Engineers gave the Seventh Circuit an
opportunity to clarify its position on this issue.
196. 726 F.2d at 1206.
197. See, e.g., Inryco, Inc. v. Metropolitan Engineering Co., 708 F.2d 1225, 1231 (7th Cir. 1983);
Breuer Electric Manufacturing Co. v. Toronado Systems of America, 687 F.2d 182, 187 (7th Cir.
1982); Ben Sager Chemicals International v. E. Targosz & Co., 560 F.2d 805, 809 (7th Cir. 1977).
On the other hand, in the rare situation where the defaulting party can demonstrate that its actions
were neither wilfull, negligent nor careless, courts will give relief from default judgments. See
United States v. $48,595, 705 F.2d 909, 913 (7th Cir. 1983); Ellingsworth v. Chrysler, 665 F.2d 180,
185 (7th Cir. 1981).
198. 726 F.2d at 1206.
199. Id., quoting from, Stevens v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 710 F.2d 1224, 1230 (7th Cir. 1983).
200. 726 F.2d at 1206.
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be perceived as an exceptional remedy.201
Applying these principles to the case at hand, the Seventh Circuit
predictably upheld the district court's order denying the defendants'
Rule 60(b) motion. Here the defendants failed to meet a twice-extended
deadline for responding to the plaintiffs interrogatories. In addition, af-
ter entry of the default judgment, the defendants waited almost two
months before seeking to have it vacated. Even then they still had not
answered any of the interrogatories nor did they make any other gesture
of good faith. These factors weighing against the defendants were not
overcome by the large amount of money at stake. Their conduct was
inexcusable, and thus the large amount of the judgment was an insuffi-
cient reason to overturn the district court's decision.202 The Seventh Cir-
cuit concluded that, under all the circumstances, the district court did
not abuse its discretion in refusing to vacate the default judgment.
In McKnight v. United States Steel Corp. ,203 the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled once again that a Rule 60(b) motion may not be
used to correct errors of law made by the district court in the underlying
decision which led to a final judgment.2°4 Rather, the proper way to seek
review of alleged legal errors is by timely appeal.20 5 The court stated that
a Rule 60(b) motion is neither a substitute for appeal nor a permissible
method to indirectly prolong the time for appeal.20 6  By not filing a
timely appeal, a litigant effectively waives his right to have errors of law
judicially reviewed.
20 7
In McKnight, the plaintiff was terminated from employment with
the defendant on August 16, 1979. Plaintiff alleged that his discharge
201. Id. The Seventh Circuit cited two considerations which mitigated any apparent harshness in
its ruling. First, a Rule 60(b) motion is not the only way to obtain relief from a default. After entry
of a default, but before entry of the final default judgment, a party may petition for relief under FED.
R. Civ. P. 55(c) ("For good cause shown the court may set aside an entry of default, and, if a
judgment by default has been entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b)").
While the elements for relief under Rule 55(c) are basically the same as under Rule 60(b), the test is
more liberally applied. 726 F.2d at 1206. See Breuer Electric, 687 F.2d at 187. Secondly, the court
emphasized that default judgments should be entered only when absolutely necessary, as where less
severe sanctions have proven ineffective. 726 F.2d at 1206. See Inryco, 708 F.2d at 1230.
202. 726 F.2d at 1208. The Seventh Circuit did recognize that under some circumstances the
amount of money at stake might be a legitimate consideration in ruling on a Rule 60(b) motion to
vacate a default judgment. Id. See De Vito v. Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland, 361 F.2d 936,
939 (7th Cir. 1966).
203. 726 F.2d 333 (7th Cir. 1984).
204. Id. at 338. See Hahn v. Becker, 551 F.2d 741, 745 (7th Cir. 1977); Swan v. United States,
327 F.2d 431, 433 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 852 (1964).
205. 726 F.2d at 337-38.
206. 726 F.2d at 338. See Peacock v. Board of School Commissioners, 721 F.2d 210, 214 (7th
Cir. 1983); Bank of California, N.A. v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 709 F.2d 1174, 1178 (7th Cir.
1983).
207. 726 F.2d at 338.
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was racially discriminatory. The Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC) learned of plaintiff's allegations in January of 1980 but
did not receive plaintiff's formal EEOC complaint until June 20, 1980.
After conducting an investigation, the EEOC concluded that there was
not reasonable cause to believe that plaintiff's charges were true. There-
after, plaintiff brought his pro se Title VII complaint in district court. In
addition, he requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and to have
counsel appointed. The district court denied plaintiff's appointment-of-
counsel request on the basis of incorrect criteria. The defendant then
moved to have the case dismissed on the ground that the district court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Finding that over 300 days had
elapsed between the date of McKnight's discharge and the date Mc-
Knight filed a formal EEOC complaint, the district court agreed that
under Moore v. Sunbeam Corp.20 8 it did not have jurisdiction. Thus, it
granted defendant's motion. McKnight did not appeal his dismissal, but
instead filed a motion to reinstate the case under Rule 60(b). This mo-
tion was denied, and plaintiff appealed.
The only issue on appeal was whether the district court abused its
discretion in denying plaintiff's Rule 60(b) motion. Three arguments
were tendered by the plaintiff. First, after the original dismissal but
before consideration of the Rule 60(b) motion, the Supreme Court de-
cided Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. ,209 which effectively overruled
Moore v. Sunbeam.210 In Zipes, the Court held that filing a timely Title
VII action with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing
suit against a private employer. Rather, it is comparable to a statute of
limitations and is subject to equitable tolling. The Seventh Circuit in
McKnight, however, ruled that, despite the change in applicable law, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's Rule 60(b)
motion. Without elaboration, the court stated that a change in the appli-
cable law does not by itself justify relief under Rule 60(b).
21 1
The plaintiff's second argument was that he had found newly dis-
covered evidence that would demonstrate that his filing with the EEOC
was in fact timely. 212 The Seventh Circuit, however, labeled McKnight's
208. 459 F.2d 811 (7th Cir. 1972). Under Moore the 300-day time limit of 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(e)
was considered jurisdictional and not subject to equitable tolling. Id.
209. 445 U.S. 385 (1982).
210. 459 F.2d 811 (7th Cir. 1972).
211. 726 F.2d at 336. The court cited De Filippis v. United States, 567 F.2d 341, 343 (7th Cir.
1977).
212. Under FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2), the court may relieve a party from a final judgment or
order by reason of "newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discov-
ered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b)."
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allegedly "new" evidence merely cumulative to evidence already in the
record. Moreover, the court interpreted plaintiff's argument as an at-
tempt to correct an alleged error of law concerning the district court's
determination of when a charge is deemed "filed" with the EEOC.
2 13
Plaintiff's final argument was that the denial of the Rule 60(b) mo-
tion should be reversed because the district court erroneously denied his
repeated requests for appointed counsel. The Seventh Circuit acknowl-
edged that the district court applied the wrong criteria in ruling on plain-
tiff's request for appointment of counsel. 214 Yet, said the court, the
proper way to correct this error in law is by filing a timely appeal, not by
bringing a Rule 60(b) motion. Rule 60(b) was not intended to correct
errors of law, and the court would not utilize it in that fashion.
As previously mentioned, relief under Rule 60(b) is an extraordinary
remedy available only in exceptional circumstances. Duran v. Elrod
21 5
serves to illustrate this well-established rule in the context of a consent
decree judgment.
In Duran, pretrial detainees in a county jail had instituted a class
action suit against county officials. The plaintiffs alleged that the county
officials had violated their rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments by failing to provide safe and humane conditions of con-
finement. After extensive negotiations, the parties agreed to a compre-
hensive consent decree that was entered by the district court. According
to the terms of the consent decree, the defendants were to implement
several measures designed to improve the conditions of confinement. To
ensure compliance, the parties appointed a Monitor who was to evaluate
the implementation of the consent decree and report its findings to the
district court at set intervals. The district court, for its part, retained
jurisdiction over the case so that it could later make whatever orders
were necessary to enforce the decree.
Six months after the entry of the consent decree, the Monitor re-
ported that the goals outlined in the decree had not been achieved. Spe-
cifically, overcrowding continued to be an acute problem with a large
number of inmates having to sleep on the floor, many without blankets or
mattresses. After holding a hearing on the matter, the district court or-
dered a "cap" on the inmate population. In response the defendants filed
213. 726 F.2d at 337.
214. Id. Appointment of counsel in Title VII actions is governed by guidelines set forth in Jones
v. WFYR Radio/RKO General, 626 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1980), overruled on other grounds, Randle v.
Victor Welding Supply Co., 664 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam). In denying the plaintiff's
appointment-of-counsel request, the district court did not use the Jones guidelines; instead the court
utilized guidelines appropriate under 28 U.S.C. §1915 for cases involving prisoners. 726 F.2d at 337.
215. 713 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1983).
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two motions--one for relief from the population "cap" order, and the
second a Rule 60(b) motion to modify the consent decree to allow
double-bunking of inmates. The district court denied both motions, and
the defendants appealed.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of both mo-
tions. In regard to the Rule 60(b) motion, the court found that the de-
fendants had demonstrated none of the elements which would justify
modification. To modify a judgment under Rule 60(b), there must have
been a significant and unforeseen change in circumstance that occurred
after the date of the final judgment.21 6 Furthermore, the new unforeseen
condition must be shown to impose extreme hardship or a grievous
wrong on the movant .2 7 Here the court noted that the defendants had
failed to show an unforeseen and substantial change in circumstances
after the entry of the agreed-upon consent decree. The jails had been
overcrowded at the time the consent decree was entered, and they re-
mained so since. In addition, the defendants failed to demonstrate how
they would suffer extreme hardship if their modification proposal was not
adopted.
In Merit Insurance Co. v. Leatherby Insurance Co. ,218 the issue was
whether the district court was justified, under Rule 60(b) and the United
States Arbitration Act,219 in setting aside an arbitration award on the
ground that one of the arbitrators failed to disclose a prior business rela-
tionship with a principal of one of the arbitrating parties. After much
dicta, the Seventh Circuit ultimately ruled that setting aside the arbitra-
tion award was not justified.
To set aside the arbitration award, the defendant had to meet the
relevant grounds for relief under both the United States Arbitration Act
and Rule 60(b). 220 Under the statutes the only relevant ground for set-
ting aside the award was if there was "evident partiality or corruption"
in any of the arbitrators. 221 Read literally this statutory provision would
require proof of actual bias. Here the court of appeals found no actual
proof of bias in the record. The court also stated that even under a more
permissive statutory construction, setting aside an arbitration award
216. Benjamin v. Malcolm, 528 F. Supp. 925, 928 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); see also United States v.
Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1931).
217. 286 U.S. at 119.
218. 714 F.2d 673 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 529 (1983).
219. 9 U.S.C. §§1 et seq. (1982).
220. The court noted that even if the arbitrator's failure to disclose was a material breach of the
ethical standards applicable to arbitration proceedings, it does not mean that the award may be set
aside judicially. 714 F.2d at 680.
221. 9 U.S.C. §10(b) (1982).
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would not be proper unless the circumstances were "powerfully sugges-
tive of bias."'222 The court did not view the arbitrator's nondisclosure in
that light and thus concluded that the statutory grounds for setting aside
the award had not been met.
The court went on to rule that the grounds for relief under Rule
60(b) had also not been met. Noting the general rule that relief under
Rule 60(b) is an extraordinary remedy the court added that this principle
is especially true where the motion is based on the catch-all ground of
Rule 60(b), Rule 60(b)(6) ("any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment"). 223 The Seventh Circuit identified two ele-
ments which must be demonstrated to justify setting aside an arbitration
award under Rule 60(b)(6): (1) that the arbitrator had violated the ethi-
cal and legal standards for arbitrators; and (2) that the violation created
a "substantial danger" that the result of arbitration was unjust.224 Find-
ing that both elements had not been shown, the court concluded that the
district court abused its discretion in granting defendant's Rule 60(b)
motion. The court expressed a concern that if it allowed relief under
these circumstances arbitration losers would be encouraged to do a post-
arbitration background check on all of the arbitrators in an attempt to
escape the adverse arbitration award.
225
APPELLATE REVIEW
Capitol Indemnity Corp. v. Keller 226 raised the question of whether
it is proper for an appellate court to reverse a judgment on a ground not
raised in the district court. In civil cases the general rule is that reversal
on such grounds is not proper. 227 However, the Seventh Circuit articu-
lated two exceptions. First, "when a serious and sensitive issue of feder-
alism is raised" 228 by the appellate court, review may be allowed on
grounds not raised in the district court. Second, the appellate courts can
act on their own to correct plain error. However, plain error review is
222. 714 F.2d at 681.
223. 714 F.2d at 682. See Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 200 (1950); Stradley v.
Cortez, 518 F.2d 488, 493 (3d Cir. 1975); Naxon Telesign Corp. v. GTE Information Systems, Inc.,
89 F.R.D. 333, 337 (N.D. Ill 1980); 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE §2857, at 160 (1973).
224. 714 F.2d at 682-83.
225. Id. at 683.
226. 717 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1983).
227. See, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976); American Fletcher Mortgage Co. v.
Bass, 688 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1982); Textile Banking Co. v. Rentachler, 657 F.2d 844, 853 (7th Cir.
1981); Smith v. No. 2 Galesburg Crown Finance Corp., 615 F.2d 407, 423 (7th Cir. 1980); Country
Fairways, Inc. v. Mottax, 539 F.2d 637, 643 (7th Cir. 1976).
228. 717 F.2d at 329.
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bounded by equitable considerations. 229 In this case, the plaintiff, a cred-
itor, brought a diversity action to set aside an alleged fraudulent convey-
ance of the defendant debtor's property. The plaintiff contended that the
conveyance of some of the defendant's property was a fraud against it.
Plaintiff claimed that the conveyance was made without consideration
and that it was undertaken while the plaintiffs original creditors suit was
still pending. The Seventh Circuit held that equitable considerations pre-
cluded the granting of plain error review. The court observed that the
plaintiff "has dragged seven individuals and a small bank through a fed-
eral litigation and appeal, and its case . . . borders on the frivolous, be-
ing limited to the plainly inapplicable lis pendens statute.
230
Consequently, the court relying on equitable considerations concluded
that the plaintiff is not to be permitted to put the defendants through the
expense of another trial. This use of the court's equitable powers not to
exercise plain error review worked justice by not penalizing the defend-
ants with a reversal on a ground not raised by the plaintiff at trial.
In Medtronic, Inc. v. Intermedics, Inc. ,231 the plaintiff sought dam-
ages, injunctive relief and an accounting based on an alleged breach of an
earlier settlement contract between the plaintiff and defendant. The
plaintiff also pressed claims for conspiracy and unfair competition. The
plaintiff complained that the defendant hired away three key sales repre-
sentatives. This hiring allegedly breached a contract settling previous
litigation between the two litigants. The defendant sought to stay this
action because a similar suit was pending in the federal district court in
Minnesota. The district court in the Northern District of Illinois denied
the stay. On appeal the Seventh Circuit was faced with considering the
appealability of orders granting or denying stays. The court observed
that if the plaintiff's claim was one cognizable in law, then the district
court's refusal to grant the stay would be appealable. However, if the
claim was solely equitable in nature then no appeal could be immediately
taken. Despite these relatively clear distinctions, this case was set in a
mixed law and equity context. In this case the plaintiff sought both tra-
ditionally legal and equitable relief. The plaintiff sought: (1) to enjoin
the defendant from further breaches of the earlier settlement agreement
with the plaintiff (equitable relief); (2) an accounting of profits (arguably
equitable relief); and (3) damages (legal relief).
To determine the appealability of stays in this mixed law and equity
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. 726 F.2d 440 (7th Cir. 1984).
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context, the court looked not to whether the plaintiffs action to be stayed
is predominantly equitable, "but [to] whether it is not predominantly
legal."' 232 In general, an order granting or denying a stay is not appeala-
ble if the "equitable relief sought is more than merely incidental to the
legal relief sought. ' 233 In determining that the district court's denial of
the requested stay was not appealable, the Seventh Circuit explicitly held
that the plaintiff's request for injunctive relief was more than merely inci-
dental to the requested legal relief of damages.
In Shaffer v. Globe Protection, Inc. ,234 the plaintiff alleged sex dis-
crimination and sought damages, declaratory and injunctive relief. The
district court denied the plaintiff class action certification and dismissed
an additional count founded in conspiracy. The plaintiff then moved for
a preliminary injunction and for reconsideration of the class action and
conspiracy decisions of the district court. Both of these requests were
rejected. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit was faced with determining the
appealability and propriety of these decisions of the trial court. The
court observed that only final orders are appealable. 235 The plaintiff ar-
gued that because interlocutory orders dealing with injunctions are re-
viewable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), 236 both the denial of the
preliminary injunction request and the connected motion to reconsider
should be reviewable by the court. In determining whether to review the
denial of the motion to reconsider, the court noted that the "other inci-
dental orders or issues nonappealable in and of themselves but in fact
interdependent with the order granting or denying the injunction may
also be reviewed, but only to the extent they bear upon and are central to
the grant or denial of the injunction. ' 237 In short, the incidental issues
must either directly control or be inextricably bound to the injunction
order. Upon a review of the record below, the court held that the plain-
tiff had presented no proof that the district court's refusal to reconsider
her class action or conspiracy count formed a basis of the denial of the
preliminary injunction request.238 Consequently, the denial of the pre-
liminary injunction and the refusal to award class action certification
232. Id. at 445.
233. Id.
234. 721 F.2d 1121 (7th Cir. 1983).
235. See 28 U.S.C. §1291 (1980) which provides: "The courts of appeal... shall have jurisdic-
tion of appeals from all final decisions."
236. 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1980) provides: "(a) The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of ap-
peals from: (1) Interlocutory orders . . . granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving
injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct review may be had in
the Supreme Court."
237. 721 F.2d at 1124.
238. Id.
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were held not to be inextricably tied. Thus the non-injunction issues
were not appealable.
Once the issues were separated, the court was able to consider, pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. §1292(a)(1), whether the district court's denial of the
motion for preliminary injunction was proper. The appellate standard
for review of a preliminary injunction is whether there was an abuse of
discretion. 239 The district court's exercise of discretion is assessed
against four prerequisites. These prerequisites require the plaintiff to
show that there is: "(1) a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits;
(2) irreparable injury and absence of an adequate remedy at law; (3) that
the threatened harm to the plaintiff outweighs the harm the injunction
may cause the defendants; and (4) that the granting of the injunction will
not disserve the public interest. ' '24° The Seventh Circuit commented that
the plaintiff's pro forma request for injunctive relief and her waiting to
appeal the district court's denial of her request were inconsistent with a
finding of irreparable harm. Therefore, the second prerequisite was lack-
ing and the court held that there was no abuse of discretion by the dis-
trict court in denying the request for injunctive relief.
DISCOVERY
This term, in the context of several cases, the Seventh Circuit ex-
amined the scope of discovery in civil cases. Two of these cases ex-
amined the discoverability of various grand jury materials. Lucas v.
Turner24' involved an appeal by the State's Attorney of Cook County of
an order directing him to release to the plaintiff, for use in a civil rights
action, all transcripts and materials of the state grand jury investigation
into the death of George Lucas. George Lucas, a 23 year old black man,
died February 9, 1973. Mr. Lucas's death occurred in the Cook County
Jail while he was awaiting trial. During 1975 a grand jury was convened
to investigate the death of Lucas. In the interim, Lucas's widow and
children initiated suit against six correctional officers, the Board of the
Cook County Department of Corrections and Winston Moore, the Di-
rector of the Cook County Jail at the time of Lucas' death. The Lucas
suit alleged that six jail guards beat, strangled and suffocated George Lu-
cas. The trial court set March 22, 1982 as the discovery cut-off date. On
that day, the plaintiffs filed an 'eleventh hour' motion to compel the pro-
duction of the transcripts and exhibits of the 1975 grand jury investiga-
239. Id. at 1123.
240. Id.
241. 725 F.2d 1095 (7th Cir. 1984).
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tion into Lucas' death. This request to compel production of the grand
jury materials was made some four years subsequent to the plaintiff's last
previous discovery request. The trial court directed the State's Attorney
of Cook County to release the requested documents and materials.
In testing whether the requested materials were discoverable, the
Seventh Circuit sought to apply the standard set out in United States v.
Sells Engineering.242 The court observed that in Sells, the Supreme
Court sought to protect the long standing policy of grand jury secrecy.
243
The Sells' court articulated a standard that required a "strong showing of
particularized need" for grand jury materials before any disclosure will
be permitted.
244
In applying the particularized need standard, the Seventh Circuit
utilized a three part analysis. First, the release of the grand jury materi-
als must be necessary to avoid possible injustice. 245 Second, the need for
disclosure must be greater than the need for continued secrecy. 246 And
finally, if the first two elements are present, the request must be struc-
tured to cover only those materials that are necessary. 247 All three ele-
ments must be present to uphold a request to release the materials. In
applying this three part analysis to the facts of the Lucas case, the court
found that the plaintiffs' request was lacking. 248 The court reasoned that
the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the requested materials of the
grand jury were absolutely necessary. The court noted that the plaintiffs
had shown only that the materials would be beneficial to their case, not
necessary. The court insisted, that to justify release of the materials
under the Sells' standard, the plaintiffs make a very specific and concrete
demonstration of their need for the materials. In addition, the need to
protect those persons exonerated by the grand jury's investigation out-
weighed the plaintiff's claimed need for the materials. The court noted
that the secrecy surrounding grand jury materials is to protect both the
witnesses who appear before it as well as to protect those under investiga-
tion. The need for this protection is based on the investigative powers of
the grand jury which allow it to indict or call witnesses before it on hear-
say and personal knowledge. Finally, the court noted that the broad na-
ture of the plaintiffs' discovery request was wholly lacking in the
242. 103 S. Ct. 3133 (1983).
243. See, e.g., United States v. Proctor and Gamble, 356 U.S. 677, 681 (1958). See also FED. R.
CRIM. P. 6(e)(2) (General Rule of Secrecy).
244. 103 S. Ct. at 3148.
245. 725 F.2d at 1102.
246. Id. at 1103-06.
247. Id. at 1106-08.
248. Id. at 1108.
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particularity of the materials sought. As a consequence, the court denied
the plaintiffs' request for release of the grand jury materials because they
had not shown a particularized need for the materials.
In the Matter of Grand Jury Proceedings, Miller Brewing Co. ,249 the
court was faced with determining the scope of disclosure of grand jury
materials to governmental non-prosecutors. Once again, the court
merely applied the standard for release of grand jury materials estab-
lished in Sells. In Miller, the government claimed that its attorneys were
entitled to automatic disclosure of grand jury materials pursuant to Fed-
eral Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3)(A)(i). 250 In rejecting this claim,
the Seventh Circuit applied the particularized need test set out in U.S. v.
Sells Engineering.251 The Sells' Court concluded that the automatic dis-
closure provision of Rule 6(e) was strictly limited to criminal matters
wherein the governmental prosecutor performs a special role in the grand
jury process.2 52 However, Miller was not a criminal case and the auto-
matic disclosure provision of Rule 6(e) was inapplicable. Instead, the
Seventh Circuit concluded that disclosure of the grand jury materials
would only be proper upon a showing of particularized need and a
weighing of "all the factors which compete in grand jury matters.
'253
In the Miller case, Miller sought to prevent the disclosure to the
government of the grand jury documents and transcripts of a previous
grand jury investigation to which they were a party. However, the Sev-
enth Circuit permitted the documents collected by the grand jury to be
disclosed. The court reasoned that the doubt which had been cast upon
the availability and existence of the documents sought, in addition to
other factors considered by the district court, justified disclosure in pref-
erence to undertaking at that late date "to demonstrate by ordinary dis-
covery means, page by page, whether the materials exist elsewhere or
not."'2 54 In addition, discovery was requested by the government, not a
private litigant, and the "willingness of grand jury witnesses to testify
candidly would be less likely affected by subsequent disclosure to the
government" than to attorneys for private litigants.255 However, the
court found that the Sells' standard may not have been met with respect
249. 717 F.2d 1136 (7th Cir. 1983).
250. This Rule provides in pertinent part: "Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of mat-
ters before the grand jury, other than its deliberations and the vote of any grand juror, may be made
to (i) an attorney for the government in the performance of such attorney's duty.
251. 717 F.2d at 1138.
252. 103 S. Ct. at 3141.
253. 717 F.2d at 1138.
254. Id. at 1139.
255. Id.
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to the request for release of the grand jury transcripts, because of the
"failure of the government to exhaust its other discovery means. ' 256
Consequently, the court purported to express no view on the merits of
the request to release the transcripts and remanded that issue back to the
district court.
Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons25 7 was an
action that had been through both the state and federal court systems.
The plaintiffs, two orthopaedic surgeons seeking admission into the de-
fendant professional society, sought damages based on the defendant's
refusal to admit them to the defendant professional society. 258 The plain-
tiffs' application for membership was rejected by the defendant without a
hearing or a statement of reasons. During pretrial discovery the plaintiffs
requested the defendant to produce files relating to denials of member-
ship applications. The defendant refused to comply even after the dis-
trict court ordered discovery. The district court then found the
defendant to be in criminal contempt and fined it $ 10,000.259 On appeal,
two separate discovery issues were examined by the Seventh Circuit.
First, the court addressed whether the validity of a contempt judg-
ment is dependent on the validity of the underlying order. The court
noted that a discovery order is not a final judgment amenable to immedi-
ate appeal. 260 Instead, the defendant had to suffer a contempt ruling
prior to taking any appeal. Judge Posner, writing for the majority, rea-
soned that the only way that the defendant would be entitled to appellate
review of the discovery order was if it: (1) disobeyed the district court's
discovery order; and (2) suffered punishment with a judgment of criminal
contempt. It was the appeal of the contempt judgment that served to
bring before the court the validity of the underlying discovery order. The
court concluded that the underlying discovery order should fall because
the entire lawsuit was barred on res judicata grounds. In addition, be-
cause the underlying order was held to be invalid, the contempt judg-
ment for disobeying it was also invalid.26' The court noted that the
defendant disobeyed the order not out of disrespect to the court's power,
but out of the reasonable belief that the underlying order was fatally
defective.
Second, the Seventh Circuit addressed the authority of the district
256. Id. at 1140.
257. 726 F.2d 1150 (7th Cir. 1984).
258. This action was brought under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1980).
259. 496 F. Supp. 236 (N.D. Il1. 1976).
260. 726 F.2d at 1158.
261. Id.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
court to control pretrial discovery under Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The court observed that the district court should
closely control the pretrial discovery aspects of cases. It noted that "the
effective management of complex litigation requires that the district
judge be allowed a broad discretion in guiding the discovery process...
and hence in deciding whether to limit discovery. ' 262 Rule 26 provides
for the issuance of sequence and timing orders and protective orders to
control and manage the discovery process. However, the use of these
judicial devices of litigation management is not unlimited. The standard
to be used in assessing the propriety of their use is to compare the hard-
ship to the party against whom discovery is sought against the hardship
to the other party if discovery is not permitted or limited. 263
The Marrese court concluded that the district court could have is-
sued Rule 26 protective orders264 or sequence and timing orders. 265 The
issuance of these orders would have served to alleviate the hardships
caused by the plaintiffs' request to view the defendant's membership deci-
sion files. The court ended by commenting that the district court should
have been more closely involved in the pretrial aspects of this case. This
level of greater involvement could have resulted in the use of the Rule 26
devices. The use of these devices would have prevented the plaintiffs
from allegedly abusing the discovery process by requesting a general re-
lease of the sensitive membership decision files of the defendant.
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COSTS, FEES AND SANCTIONS
Fees and Costs as Sanctions
In Textor v. Board of Regents,267 the awarding of attorney's fees was
recognized as being within the inherent power of the district court. In
Textor, the plaintiff was employed by the defendant as women's athletic
director and coach of the women's basketball and tennis teams. The
plaintiff filed a class action suit alleging both constitutional and statutory
causes of action. Specifically, she claimed that men's and women's ath-
letics received disparate treatment in violation of the civil rights laws. At
trial, the district court found that the plaintiff had filed a defective com-
plaint. The court refused to grant the plaintiff leave to amend her com-
plaint. Instead, the district court "found that the complaint lacked any
262. Id. at 1159.
263. Id.
264. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
265. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(d).
266. 726 F.2d at 1162.
267. 711 F.2d 1387 (7th Cir. 1983).
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colorable basis for jurisdiction or venue, that the plaintiff's attorneys
failed to respond to the defendant's motions adequately, and that [the
plaintiff's] counsel's failure to sign the complaint after that omission had
been brought to . . . [their] attention amounted to a wilful abuse of the
judicial process." '268 This wilful abuse justified, to the district court, the
awarding of fees and costs against the plaintiff. The Seventh Circuit
noted that the district court's power to award fees was to be exercised to:
(1) punish litigants and their attorneys for abuse of the judicial process;
and (2) to protect the orderly administration of justice.269
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the district court erred in
refusing the plaintiff leave to amend her defective complaint.270 How-
ever, the court noted that the granting of leave to amend does not neces-
sarily provide relief from blame for filing an originally defective
complaint. The mere fact that this action was unsuccessful as originally
plead does not give a "basis for assuming counsel acted in bad faith. ' 27 1
The district court's power to award attorney's fees is not to be exercised
against losing counsel but rather against counsel who are guilty of abus-
ing the judicial process.
At trial, the district court did not afford the plaintiffs counsel the
opportunity to explain their actions prior to its assessing fees against the
plaintiff. The Seventh Circuit held that "[a]lthough truly egregious con-
duct by counsel may support a finding of wilful abuse without inquiry
• . . in a case such as this in which counsel's conduct is as indicative of
incompetence as it is of bad faith[,] the [district] court was not justified in
placing the burden of justification on counsel. ' 272 In short, notions of
procedural due process require that notice and a hearing be provided
prior to the awarding of fees for abuse of judicial process. Accordingly,
the Seventh Circuit remanded the case for a hearing. However, it ex-
pressed no opinion as to whether the plaintiffs counsel were guilty of
wilful abuse of the judicial process.
In a related matter in Textor, the Seventh Circuit overturned the
district court's refusal to award fees to one of the defendants who was
represented by its own salaried in-house counsel.2 73 It rejected the rea-
soning that fees are awarded to compensate and that reliance on in-house
counsel incurs no additional compensable expense. 274 In support of its
268. Id. at 1394.
269. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766 (1980).
270. 711 F.2d at 1393.
271. Id. at 1395.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 1397.
274. Id.
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holding, the court noted that a party's decision as to how to engage coun-
sel should have no bearing on the question of fees. The court stated that
the relevant determination is whether fees are reasonable, rather than a
determination of the amount of fees actually paid or the manner in which
they were paid. The amount and manner of payment for legal counsel is
only to be used as a guide for the court, it is not to be determinative. 275
In addition to a district court's inherent power to award fees against a
litigant for abuse of the judicial process, there is authority in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure for such awards. Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 37(b) authorizes the courts to impose sanctions, including the
awarding of attorney fees, against disobedient parties. 276 In Tamari v.
Bache & Co. (Lebanon) SAL, 277 the district court awarded fees to the
defendant. The award was pursuant to Rule 37(b). This case, which
began in 1975, was punctuated by the plaintiffs' continued non-compli-
ance with discovery requests. Finally in 1983, the district court set a
discovery deposition cut-off date. After the plaintiffs failed to meet the
cut-off date, defendant filed a motion for expenses incurred as a result of
the plaintiffs' failure to meet the deadline set by the court. The district
court held the plaintiff and its counsel jointly liable under Rule 37(b).
Only the plaintiffs' counsel appealed the court's decision. The counsel
contended that the imposition of sanctions under Rule 37(b) was not
appropriate.
The counsel argued that the imposition of sanctions under Rule
37(b), was appropriate only when a "party violates a court order because
of wilfulness, bad faith or fault. ' 278 He noted that no court order to
compel discovery had been violated. The court rejected this reasoning
and held that culpability determines only the type of sanctions that
should be imposed, not whether sanctions are appropriate. In addition,
the court noted that formal motions to compel discovery are not a condi-
tion precedent to sanctions if the party against whom the sanctions even-
tually issue had adequate notice and an opportunity to explain their
actions. 279 Also, the defendant requested that the appellate costs associ-
ated with the plaintiffs' appeal of the sanctions be awarded to it. In re-
viewing the case, the court determined that the awarding of appellate
275. Id. at 1396.
276. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b) provides in relevant part that: "In lieu of any of the foregoing orders
or in addition thereto, the court shall require the party failing to obey the order or the attorney
advising him or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the
failure."
277. 729 F.2d 469 (7th Cir. 1984).
278. Id. at 473.
279. Id. at 472; accord Stevens v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 710 F.2d 1224 (7th Cir. 1983).
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costs is consistent with the purpose underlying Rule 37(b). 280 Basically,
the court reasoned that if sanctions awarded by the district court could
be lost on appeal, even if they were upheld, by the expenditure of addi-
tional monies to protect the award, there would exist a disincentive to
seek sanctions at trial. In general, the court implicitly noted that appel-
late costs, including the payment of attorneys' fees, should not be permit-
ted to outweigh the sanction that is awarded at trial.
In addition to the district court's ability to award fees under Rule
37(b) there may also be awards of sanctions when frivolous appeals are
prosecuted. Reid v. United States2 1 investigated the grounds that may
support an award of costs and fees for an improper appeal. In Reid, the
plaintiff-appellants alleged that the federal government was guilty of tres-
pass. The plaintiffs alleged that the government had trespassed on its
land by maintaining the Ohio River at an artificially high level. They
sought an injunction requiring the defendant to lower the river's level.
The district court rejected the plaintiffs' complaint on the ground that it
was barred by sovereign immunity and dismissed the action. The plain-
tiffs appealed this dismissal. The government requested an assessment of
costs and fees against the plaintiff for what it termed a frivolous appeal.
The court held that costs and fees for a frivolous appeal may be recov-
ered under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.282 The test for de-
termining when sanctions under this rule are appropriate is (1) whether
the appeal is frivolous; and (2) whether the case is appropriate for sanc-
tions. 28 3 The court noted that to reach a determination that an appeal is
frivolous, the appellee must have shown more than a mere lack of suc-
cess. Frivolous appeals are those in which the law involved is so well
established that persistence by the appellant is evidence of bad faith. The
court also noted that when the appellant can show no reasonable expec-
tation of altering the district court decision, and appeals only for the
purpose of delay, harassment or obstinancy, sanctions are then appropri-
ate.28 4 In assessing the requested fees and costs against the plaintiff-ap-
pellant, the court sua sponte raised the issue in three additional actions
that had been consolidated for appeal. In each of these actions, based on
the same claims, the court awarded double costs under Rule 38 against
each of the four separate appellants. 285
280. 729 F.2d at 475.
281. 715 F.2d 1148 (7th Cir. 1983).
282. FED. R. App. P. 38 provides: "If a court of appeals shall determine that an appeal is
frivolous, it may award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee."
283. 715 F.2d at 1154-55.




The balance between the privacy of the attorney-client privilege and
the right to select counsel of one's choice was at issue in Schiessle v. Ste-
phens.286 The plaintiff selected the law firm of Ross, Hardies, O'Keefe,
Babcock & Parsons (Ross, Hardies) to represent her. A partner in this
firm filed an appearance on her behalf. Thereafter and prior to filing at,
official appearance on behalf of the defendant, attorney Michael King, on
behalf of the defendants, asked the plaintiffs to dismiss their action
against the defendant. King, at the time, was associated with the law
firm of Antonow & Fink. Approximately two months later, having never
filed an official appearance in the case, King left Antonow & Fink and
joined the firm of Ross, Hardies. Two years later, Antonow & Fink de-
manded dismissal of this action or threatened to move to disqualify Ross,
Hardies. Plaintiff refused to dismiss the lawsuit. Consequently, the de-
fendant moved to disqualify Ross, Hardies from representing the plaintiff
in this action. Disqualification .was premised on the ground that King
had participated in the defense of the defendant and therefore should not
be allowed to be associated with representation of the plaintiff. Ross,
Hardies disagreed with this argument and sought a declaration of qualifi-
cation. However, the district court granted the defendant's cross-motion
to disqualify Ross, Hardies.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit sought to determine whether the dis-
qualification of Ross, Hardies was proper. The court held that disqualifi-
cation would be proper if: (1) there existed a "substantial relationship
between the subject matter of the prior and present representations"; and
(2) the presumption of shared confidences with respect to the prior repre-
sentation is not rebutted, or the presumption of shared confidences with
respect to the present relationship is not rebutted.2 87 As is evident from
this analytical framework, the presumption of shared confidences is re-
buttable. However, the court noted that this presumption can be rebut-
ted only upon a showing of specific institutional mechanisms that have
been put in place to prevent shared confidences. In Schiessle the subject
matter of both representations was the same antitrust suit. Also, the
court found that Ross, Hardies put no formal institutional mechanisms
in place to stop the sharing of confidential information. Consequently,
the disqualification of Ross, Hardies was affirmed.
2 88
286. 717 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1983).
287. Id. at 420.
288. Id. at 421.
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Collateral Claims
In many civil actions more than one claim for relief is plead. It is
possible, of course, for a plaintiff to be successful on some but not all the
claims plead. In Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago,2 89 the plaintiff brought
thirteen separate claims stemming out of a Chicago Police Department
strip search rule. This rule required that all women arrested and de-
tained in Chicago Police lock-ups were to be subjected to a strip and
body cavity search regardless of the charges upon which they were being
held. The rule did not apply to men. As a result of being arrested and
subjected to the above described search, the plaintiff brought several sep-
arate claims based on civil rights violations, excessive force and false
arrest. The plaintiff prevailed on her civil rights claim only. Due to her
success on only one of her claims, the district court denied the plaintiff
attorneys' fees. The plaintiff argued that she was entitled to fees for the
entire case because the claims on which she eventually did not prevail
were intertwined with the one on which she was successful. The Seventh
Circuit noted that fees are awarded at the discretion of the trial judge.
However, the trial court was not without guidance. In Hensley v. Eck-
erhart290 the Supreme Court held that when a plaintiff is successful on
only a portion of her claims, fees cannot be recovered for time expended
on unsuccessful and unrelated claims. 29' By implication, the Seventh Cir-
cuit held that fees may not be recovered for time expended on unsuccess-
ful related claims. 292 In an analogous manner, when claims are brought
against several defendants and not all are found liable, the total time
expended in taxing this action to court is recoverable if the non-liable
defendants were not frivolously named. In Mary Beth G., the plaintiff
was successful only on her civil rights claim. However, because the court
determined her other claims, 293 which were unsuccessful, to be both in-
dependent of and unrelated to the course of conduct complained of in the
civil rights action, recovery was limited to the fees incurred in support of
the civil rights claim. As a result, the court awarded the plaintiff fees
under §1988.
Costs Under Rule 54(d)
As a general rule, at common law each party to a lawsuit was re-
289. 723 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983).
290. 103 S. Ct. 1933 (1983).
291. Id. at 1940.
292. 723 F.2d at 1279.
293. The plaintiff also brought claims for recovery for false arrest and for excessive force. Id. at
1267.
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sponsible for his own costs and attorneys fees. Only bad faith litigation
shifted the burden of costs and fees to the losing party. 294 However, Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) alters this common law rule. Rule
54(d) provides that "costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing
party unless the court otherwise directs." 295 In Bittner v. Sadoff and
Rudoy Industries,29 6 the Seventh Circuit noted that the prevailing party
was entitled to an award of costs and fees unless the opponent's position
was substantially justified or unless there were special circumstances.
In Badillo v. Central Steel and Wire Co. ,297 the court articulated one
of these special circumstances. It held that it was within the discretion of
the district court to consider indigency when acting under Rule 54(d). In
Badillo, the plaintiff's indigency, was sufficent to overcome the presump-
tion under Rule 54 (d) that costs will be awarded to the prevailing party.
CONCLUSION
Even in reviewing the decisions of just one court of appeals in only
one area of the law, the reviewer cannot fail to be impressed by the vari-
ety of cases the court is required to decide. Rather than drawing artifi-
cial conclusions from such a varied body of cases, the reviewers express
the desire that this article will serve as useful guide and research tool for
the practicing attorney as he or she confronts issues of federal civil
procedure.
294. See Benner v. Negley, 725 F.2d 446 (7th Cir. 1984).
295. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d).
296. 728 F.2d 820 (7th Cir. 1984).
297. 717 F.2d 1160 (7th Cir. 1983).

